Casting light into  the black hole :  partisan politics of European compliance by Camyar, Isa
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2007
Casting light into "the black hole": partisan politics
of European compliance
Isa Camyar
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, icamya1@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




CASTING LIGHT INTO “THE BLACK HOLE”: PARTISAN 












Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of 












B.A., Bilkent University, 2001 





























Writing this dissertation has been a long journey with numerous hurdles. The completion 
of the project was possible because these hurdles have been cleared by the guidance, 
confidence and love of some people. 
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Leonard Ray, who 
guided me through the proceeding of the project. He always had confidence in me and 
provided feedbacks that made life much easier for me. I would also like to thank the 
members of my dissertation committee, who provided their most invaluable comments at 
the proposal defense and final exam stages. With feedbacks from them, this project has 
broader aims. 
In completing the project, the biggest contribution came from the most special 
person in my life, my beloved wife Bahar Ulupinar. She gave to me the hope, spirit, 
strength and inspiration that proved the most vital in completing a project of this 
magnitude. My love, with you by my side, there is no mountain that I cannot climb, no 
oceans that I cannot sail, no sky that I cannot reach. I love you so much, and with all my 









TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………...……………………………………….iii 
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………..…..………………………..…..vii 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………..viii 
ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………….……………….....ix 
INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………..1 
Literature Review: Filling the “Black Hole”? ……………………..…………………2 
Issue 1: Scarcity of Theoretical Achievements ………………………………...…3 
Issue 2: Failure to Adequately Chart the Domestic Politics of Compliance............3     
Issue 3: Unrealized Potentials of the Large-N Research Design …………………4 
How to Solve the Issues: The Contributions of This Project…….……………..…5 
The Theoretical Orientation of the Project: The Partisan Approach to International 
Compliance…………………………………………………………………………....6 
The Methodological Orientation of the Project……………………………………...12 
The Organization of the Project…………………………………………...................14 
CHAPTER ONE: THEORY: THE PARTISAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
(NON) COMPLIANCE………………………………………………………………….16 
Introduction ……………………………………………………………….................16 
Navigating Through Theoretical Approaches to International (Non) 
Compliance……………………………………………………………...………..….18 
 The Rationalist Approach………………………………………………………..19 
 The Managerial Approach……………………………………………………….20 
 The Normative Approach ……………………………………………………….21 
 The Second-Image-Reversed Approaches….……………………………………22 
 Problems with the Existing Approaches………………………………………....23 





CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN……………………………………...……….43 
Introduction ……………………………………………….........................................43 





Influence in the EU Rule Making Process…………………………………...56 
Dependence on the EU……………………………………………………….56 
Material Capacity…………………………………………………………….57 
Socialization………………………………………………………………….57 
Other Domestic Institutional and Political Variables………………………..58 
Possible Biases in the Infringement Data……………………………………59 
The Mode of Analysis…..………………………………………………………........62 
Summary……………………………………………………………………………..63 
CHAPTER THREE: PARTISAN PREFERENCES AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
GENERAL EU POLICIES………………………………………………………………64 
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………64 
European Integration as a Market Building Project…………………………………65 
Customs Union..…………………………………………………………………68 
Single Market……………………………………………….................................69 




CHAPTER FOUR: PARTISAN PREFERENCES AND COMPLIANCE WITH DE-
REGULATORY POLICIES……………………………………………………………..84 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..84 
Exemplary De-Regulatory Policies…………………………………………………..86 
Competition Policy………………………………………………………………86 
Anti-Trust: Restrictive Practices…………………………..............................87 
Anti-trust: Abuse of Dominance…………………………..............................88 
Merger Control……………………………………………………………….88 
State Aids (Subsidies)……………………………………..............................89 
The Liberalization of Public Utilities………………………………………..90 
Industrial, Enterprise, and Research and Development Policies….......................90 
Industrial Policy……………………………………………………………...91 
Enterprise Policy……………………………...……………………………...93 







CHAPTER FIVE: PARTISAN PREFERENCES AND COMPLIANCE WITH RE-
REGULATORY POLICIES……………………………………………………………104 
Introduction…………………………………………………………........................104 
Exemplary Re-Regulatory Policies………………………………...……………….106 
 v
Social and Employment Policy...……………………………………………….107 
Regional Policy...……………………………………………………………….111 




Summary of General Theoretical and Empirical Findings…………………………124 
Broader Substantial Implications…………………………………………………...126 
 EU Studies……………………………………………………………………...127 
 International Relations and Comparative Politics………………………………129 





























LIST OF TABLES 
1. 3.1 Descriptive Statistics …………………………………………………...……77 
 
2. 3.2 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems…………………..78 
 
3. 4.1 Breakdown of Infringement Actions in De-Regulatory Policies from January 
1995 to May 2004 into Countries and the Stages and Infringement………..……99 
 
4. 4.2 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………..100 
 
5. 4.3 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems across De-
Regulatory Policies………………………………….………………………….102 
 
6. 4.4 National Governments as of 30 April 2004, Their Partisan Compositions and 
the Predicted Probabilities of Being Referred to the Court of Justice on the Basis 
of Their Preferences about the Process and Substance of the EU Policy 
Making………………………………………………………………………….103 
 
7. 5.1 Breakdown of Infringement Actions in Re-Regulatory Policies from January 
1995 to May 2004 into Countries and the Stages of Infringement…………..…119 
 
8. 5.2 Descriptive Statistics………………………………………………………..120 
 
9. 5.3 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems across Re-
Regulatory Policies……………………………………………………………..122 
 
10. 5.4 National Governments as of 30 April 2004, their Partisan Compositions and 
the Predicted Probabilities of Being Referred to the Court of Justice on the Basis 















LIST OF FIGURES 
1. 3.1 Pro-Europeanness and the Predicted Probability of Being Referred to the 
Court of Justice……………………………………………………...…………...79 
 
2. 3.2 Support for Market Economy and the Predicted Probability of Being Referred 






















The main analytical concern of this project is to develop and use innovative theoretical 
and methodological tools to explain the compliance process in the European Union (EU). 
There are three major issues in the existing literature on EU compliance: lack of 
theoretical achievement, failure to adequately chart the domestic politics of EU 
compliance and underrealized potential of the Large-N Research design. This project 
addresses each of these issues. 
As far as the first and second issues are concerned, I identify the lack of a 
sustained dialogue with international relations and comparative politics as the main 
limitation of the existing literature. Based on this diagnosis, I develop the most 
systematic theoretical treatment to date of the domestic politics of EU compliance, which 
rely on insights drawn from various literatures in international relations and comparative 
politics. Developing a partisan approach to International compliance, which applies not 
only to the EU, but also all other instances of international regulatory regimes, I 
demonstrate that domestic contestations over compliance with international rules, being 
structured along different preferences toward the process and substance of international 
rule making and mediated through partisan politics, systematically affect the compliance 
patterns of the governments of the member states. The partisan approach yields two 
hypotheses, the process and substance, each of which concerns the impact of preferences 
toward the process and substance of the European rule making on the compliance 
patterns of member states. 
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As far as the third issue is concerned, I employ the Large-N quantitative analysis 
to test empirical models based on the partisan approach. Relying on a data set of all 
infringement actions from 1995 to 2004, I test the process and substance hypotheses of 
the partisan approach in the context of the European Union through a series of empirical 
analyses. In the empirical analyses, I first examine the compliance patterns of member 
states across all policy areas, and then investigated compliance patterns in sub categories 
of EU policies, de-regulatory and re-regulatory policies. Different empirical models yield 
the same results that the party preferences of national governments have a systematic 



























The thrust of this project is to explicate the politically contested nature of compliance 
with the rules and regulations of the European Union (EU). My main question is how 
domestic distributive and allocative contestations among societal actors affect EU 
compliance. I explore this question by examining the impact of partisan politics, which 
crystallize and mold these contestations, on member states’ patterns of compliance with 
EU rules and regulations. I claim that compliance with EU rules and regulations 
necessarily evokes distributional and allocative issues, which makes it subject to 
domestic contestation. Domestic contestation over compliance is structured around 
diverse social preferences regarding the process and substantive outcomes of EU rule 
making. Political parties, which aggregate and distill these preferences into partisan 
orientations, add their partisan biases into the compliance patterns of governments that 
they compose. 
As such, this project is a part of ongoing efforts to fill what Weiler once described 
as a “black hole” in our understanding of EU compliance (Weiler, 1988, 1991). Wieler 
noticed that while the smooth functioning and effectiveness of EU were increasingly 
contingent upon the extent to which member states complied with its rules and 
regulations, our understanding of the determinants of compliance with EU rules remained 
limited. After almost two decades of scholarly endeavors, the literature on EU 
compliance seems to have arrived at a crucial moment where scholars share serious 
doubts as to how successful the endeavors in the literature have been in filling the black 
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hole (Mastenbroek, 2005). In the following, I discuss the theoretical and methodological 
issues which make scholars have a gloomy assessment of the achievements of the 
literature and how I address these issues in this project. Later, I present the theoretical 
and methodological orientations of the project and finish this introduction by laying out 
the organization of the project. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: FILLING THE “BLACK HOLE”? 
Over more than a half of century of its evolution, the EU has accumulated a huge body of 
rules and regulations. With the increasing volume of these rules and regulations, the issue 
of compliance has become more accentuated. Associating with the growing appreciation 
of the importance of compliance for integration was an increasingly strong lament that 
scholars and policy makers have voiced about what is referred to as the implementation 
deficit that supposedly plagues the EU (Mendriou, 1996; Snyder, 1993; Tallberg, 1999; 
Borzel, 2001). The implementation deficit is assumed to be stemming from the fact that 
the EU has the capacity to make rules, but lacks the capacity to directly implement or 
enforce them, which practically makes it almost completely dependent on its member 
states for the implementation of its rules. The implementation deficit is alleged to hamper 
the smooth functioning of the EU and, more seriously, has a potential to kill the very 
purposes of integration (McCormick, 2001). This growing alarm over the implementation 
deficit accompanying with an increasing realization of a “black hole” in our 
understanding of EU compliance has fueled a huge bulk of scholarly efforts since the late 
1980s (Borzel, 2001). 
Despite non-negligible progress in our understanding of EU compliance, scholars 
in the field recently question whether their substantive efforts have been successful in 
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filling the “black hole” in our understanding of EU compliance (Mastenbroek, 2005). 
They have noticed at least three major issues that the literature has not been much 
successful in addressing, but need to be dealt with if progress in our understanding of the 
EU compliance process is to be achieved. 
Issue 1: Scarcity of Theoretical Achievements 
The first issue is the lack of theoretical progress in the literature. While the existing 
scholarship in the literature has made substantial efforts in conceptualizing and 
developing analytical stories to account for EU compliance, the theoretical achievements 
of the literature have been at best sketchy. Some studies have not gone beyond the 
descriptive evaluations of the policy compliance patterns of member states (Richardson, 
1996; Mendrinou, 1996; Weiler, 1991; Azzi, 2000; Peters, 1997; Borzel 2001). Most 
others have been eclectic and pointed out various relevant factors to explain EU 
compliance, but have failed to formulate them into more generalizable propositions (Knill 
& Lenschow, 1998; Bursens, 2002; Borzel, 2003; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leider, 
2005). Some other studies have tried to systematically apply the major theoretical 
approaches from International Relations literature, but their empirical models yield either 
insignificant or inconsistent results that go against the theoretical expectations (Mbaye, 
2001; Mastenbrook, 2003). Therefore, despite all the efforts in the literature to elucidate 
the determinants of EU compliance, our theoretical understanding of the process still 
remains limited. 
Issue 2: Failure to Adequately Chart the Domestic Politics of Compliance 
The second issue, related with the first one, is the failure to adequately chart the domestic 
politics of compliance. Scholars have noticed the role of domestic variables in the 
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compliance process, but those variables, like administrative and institutional traditions, 
material capacity and resources, are mostly technical and static. The literature has failed 
to systematically explore the politics of EU compliance or domestic contestations waged 
over compliance with EU rules. On this point, the literature could have hugely benefited 
from a dialogue with another booming field in the EU literature, which is the field of 
European integration and political contestations (Marks & Steenbergen, 2004). Scholars 
in this literature charted the contours of domestic conflicts on European integration. But, 
unfortunately, the EU compliance literature still has to capitalize on the major insights 
springing from the elaborate instigations of political conflicts over the EU. 
Issue 3: Unrealized Potentials of the Large-N Research Design 
The last, but not least, issue that the EU compliance literature appears to be troubled with 
is a methodological one. The dominant methodological orientations informing the 
previous studies have been the case study and comparative methods. Studies employing 
these methods have deepened our understanding of European compliance by developing 
different hypotheses and elaborating mechanisms linking compliance with factors of 
interest through single or comparative case studies. Despite the substantial contributions 
of these research designs, scholars are concerned with having ended up with too many 
hypotheses that all seem plausible in explaining EU compliance. The inherent limitations 
of the case study and comparative methods make it difficult to test these hypotheses in 
one research design. Scholars agree that literature would gain much from the full 
realization of the large-N research design supposed to be better equipped to test a number 
of hypotheses in a multivariate analysis (Mastenbroek, 2003, 2005). 
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How to Solve the Issues: The Contributions of This Project 
In this project, I am primarily concerned with the main issues that are points where the 
literature can be expanded. In my effort, I develop innovative theoretical and 
methodological tools that, I claim, help to cast more illuminating light into the black hole 
in our understanding of EU compliance. 
As far as the first and second issues are concerned, I claim that what is really 
lacking in the literature on EU compliance is a sustained dialogue with other possibly 
relevant literatures in IR and Comparative politics. I argue that the students of EU 
compliance have much to gain from the analytical tools and theoretical insights of these 
relevant literatures. In this project, I engage with relevant literatures in Comparative 
Politics and International Relations and undertake the much-needed dialogue with them. 
Drawing on analytical tools and insights from the International Relations literatures on 
international regimes and institutions, international compliance, globalization and 
interdependence and the Comparative Politics literatures on public policy, political 
parties and partisan politics, I come up with a theoretical approach that I call as the 
partisan approach to international compliance. I theorize that compliance with rules in 
regulatory regimes is intrinsically connected to the domestic process of distribution and 
allocation of resources and values, which makes it subject to contestation among 
domestic actors. This contestation is implicated in the compliance process through the 
partisan politics. My approach both provides analytical tools generalizable to other 
instances of international compliance and sheds lights on political contestations over 
compliance at the domestic level. 
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Addressing the third issue, I test the partisan approach through a large-N research 
design. In the empirical analyses of the compliance patterns of member states, I test the 
partisan politics approach controlling other relevant variables that the literature has 
studied. In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly present the theoretical and 
methodological orientations of the project, which better illustrates how I address the main 
substantive and methodological issues of the EU compliance literature. 
THE THEORETICAL ORIENTATION OF THE PROJECT: THE PARTISAN 
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 
 
Convinced that EU compliance is an instance of a broader phenomenon of compliance in 
international regulatory regimes, I develop a general theoretical approach to international 
compliance and apply it to the EU compliance process. My approach causally connects 
domestic contestations over distribution and allocation of resources and values, partisan 
politics and international compliance. There are three main propositions that the partisan 
approach to international compliance is predicated on. 
Proposition (1):  
Compliance with the rules of international regimes is essentially connected to the 
domestic distribution and allocation of resources and values. 
This proposition is grounded in the notion that the rise of international regulatory regimes 
represents the internationalization of public authority and the extension of the domestic 
policy process beyond national boundaries (Ruggie, 1983). Conventionally, the state has 
been the main holder of public authority in a given territory granted with the ultimate 
right to make binding decisions on substantial policy issues and problems (Weber, 1958 
[1948]). One of the backbones of justification for the state’s hold over public authority 
has been its ability to provide an organizational and political framework to effectively 
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address policy issues within its own territory. At a general level, there are three main 
policy issues that give content to the exercise of public authority: establishing and 
maintaining security and order, building mechanisms for wealth creation and providing a 
measure of social, economic and physical welfare for the public. How these policy issues 
are authoritatively dealt with has distinct and often conflicting allocative and distributive 
consequences for societal actors and thus constitutes the crux of the domestic policy 
process, in which societal actors compete over how resources and values are allocated 
and distributed. 
In addressing these policy issues, the state has tended to follow a sovereign or 
national mode of governance, which involves reliance on its own organizational, human 
and material capacities to manage the main policy issues. However, with the trends of 
interdependence and globalization involving the growing expansion of the scale of social, 
economic, political interactions beyond national boundaries, the capacity of the state as a 
distinct organizational and political unit appropriate to effectively manage these policy 
issues and maintain independent policies has come under strains (Keohane & Nye, 1977; 
Zurn, 2002). As a response to the strains in the governance capacity of the states, a nexus 
of international governance has emerged (Young, 1999; Held, 2002, 8). This nexus 
consists in mechanisms of “rule-making, policy coordination and problem-solving”, in 
which states pool and delegate their authority to address policy issues at the international 
level. International regulatory regimes are enmeshed in this nexus of international 
governance (Young, 1999). 
A variety of regulatory regimes have arisen to help states to achieve policy 
outcomes. It is possible to put international regulatory regimes into three broad types on 
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the basis of substantive policy issues that they are designed to address, which incidentally 
correspond to the major policy issues that the state is expected to manage. These types 
are security-oriented, wealth-oriented and welfare-oriented regimes. Security-oriented 
regimes are a response to states’ truncated capacity to deal with their own internal and 
external security on a sovereign basis. The major examples of this type of regulatory 
regime consist in the arms control and nuclear proliferation regimes, which provide states 
with collective mechanisms to deal with major security issues of international origin 
(Zacher, 1992; Haftendorn & Wallander, 1999). Wealth-oriented regimes allow states to 
manage the internationalization of mechanisms of wealth creation. A chief example 
includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) /World Trade 
Organization, where states agree on collective tools to manage global trade, a chief 
economic issue vital for the economic well-being or wealth of their citizens (Gilpin, 
2001). Welfare-oriented regimes are designated to provide collective devices to address 
social, economic and ecological welfare issues that are often transnational in their origin. 
Probably the best example of this type of regime is environmental regimes addressing 
ecological welfare issues, like pollution (Young, 1989). 
Being a response to the state’s strained governance capacity to manage the main 
policy issues, the rise of international regulatory mechanisms involves internationalizing 
public authority through pooling and delegating it in those mechanisms and thus 
extending the domestic policy process beyond national boundaries (Young, 1999; 
Ruggie, 1983). Hence, policy decisions on the security, wealth and welfare of the 
citizens, which inexorably have consequences for the domestic allocation and distribution 
of resources and values, are not exclusively confined to the domestic political process, 
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but are increasingly made through international rule making mechanisms. What these 
mean for compliance with rules and commitments made in these mechanisms is that it is 
bound to evoke distributional and allocative concerns among societal actors at the 
domestic level. 
Proposition (2): 
Due to its consequences for the domestic distribution and allocation of resources and 
values, compliance with the rules of international regulatory regimes is subject to 
domestic contestation, which is structured by diverse social preferences regarding 
process and substantive outcome of international rule making. 
If compliance with international rules and commitments are linked to the process of 
distribution and allocation of resources and values at the domestic level, it becomes 
subject to domestic contestation. I claim that domestic contestation over compliance with 
international rules and regulations is structured by diverse social preferences over 
international rule making. These preferences can be organized into two dimensions: a 
process dimension and a substance dimension. 
The process dimension is related to the appropriateness of international rule 
making mechanisms to address specific policy issues of distributive and allocative 
consequences. Although the need for an international mode of governance has become 
more pervasive as the strains in the governance capacities of states tighten, it does not go 
uncontested. Domestic actors have different preferences concerning the extent to which 
policy issues are to be handled through an international rather than a national mode of 
governance. On one end of the continuum lie those who favor a national mode of 
governance. On the other end are those who support the idea of an international mode of 
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governance. Those closer to the international end of the continuum tend to support 
compliance with rules created through an international mode of governance more than 
those closer to the national end of the continuum. 
While the process dimension taps into the appropriateness of rule making 
mechanisms, the substance dimension concerns the intended policy outcomes of rules 
created through these mechanisms. Depending on how international rules affect the 
distribution and allocation of resources and values at the domestic level, societal actors 
form their preferences as to how compliant their governments ought to be in putting these 
rules into effect. Those social actors whose interests or values the substantive outcomes 
of international rules serve or reflect are likely to be more supportive of compliance with 
these rules than social actors whose interests or value stances are adversely affected by 
the intended policy outcome of these rules. 
Proposition (3): 
Being the most visible and direct  intermediary between social preferences and political 
authority in modern politics, political parties aggregate and distill social preferences 
regarding the process and substance of international rule making into partisan 
orientations, and inject these orientations into the compliance patterns of governments 
that they compose. 
Divergent social preferences regarding the process and substantive outcomes of 
international rule making are represented and aggregated through intermediary 
institutions, like political parties, interest groups and social movements. Of these 
intermediary institutions, my approach takes political parties as the principal one. 
Although there are debates over the decline of parties in their aggregation and 
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representation roles, political parties still constitute the most direct and visible linkage 
between social preferences and political authority (Dalton, 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; 
Diamond & Gunter, 2001). I also assume that political parties are policy seekers. Parties 
distill divergent social preferences into concrete policy objectives and proposals. Using 
governmental power, they convert these policy objectives and proposals into concrete 
policy outcomes. Scholars have shown that political parties tend to inject their partisan 
biases in various governmental actions not only at the domestic level but also at the 
international level, like humanitarian interventions, trade and exchange rates (Rathbun, 
2004; Simmons, 1994; Verdier, 1994). Likewise, I expect that political parties add their 
partisan biases and programmatic orientations related to the process and substantive 
outcome of international rule making into the international compliance patterns of 
governments that they compose. 
The partisan approach yields two major hypotheses, which respectively concern 
the process and substantive outcomes of international rule making. 
The Process Hypothesis: 
Governments with a more favorable stance toward European integration and a European 
mode of governance are likely to display a better performance in international 
compliance than governments with a less favorable stance. 
The Substance Hypothesis: 
Governments with a more favorable stance toward the intended policy outcome or 
substance of European rule making are likely to comply with these rules better than 
governments with a less favorable stance. 
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Applying these hypotheses to the EU compliance process, I expect that the 
governments of member states with different partisan preferences related to the process 
and substance of European rule making are likely to exhibit different (non) compliance 
patterns. 
THE METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION OF THE PROJECT 
As noted previously, the methodological orientations of previous studies in the EU 
compliance literature have been predominantly the case study and comparative methods. 
While appreciating the contributions of these research designs, I join the chorus of those 
who argue that the potential of large-N quantitative methods have not been sufficiently 
realized in the literature (Mastenbrook, 2003; Mbaye, 2001). In my empirical analysis, I 
ascertain the impact of the partisan preferences of national governments on their patterns 
of compliance with EU rules and regulations through a large-N research design. 
The dependent variable of my analysis is the compliance patterns of EU member 
states across policy areas with different distributive and allocative consequences. 
Compliance is generally defined as the conformity of behaviors to rules and regulations 
(Raustiala & Maria- Slaughter, 2002). Scholars have noticed that compliance and non-
compliance do not represent a dichotomy, but a continuum; there is a wide spectrum of 
possibilities between compliance and non-compliance, like partial and late compliance 
(Young, 1979). To measure how well member states comply with EU rules, I refer to 
their behaviors in what is known as the infringement procedure. In the EU compliance 
literature, the data on infringement procedures and especially on the frequency of 
appearance at the different stages of the infringement procedure have been used by a 
number of studies in the EU compliance literature for illustrative and explanatory 
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purposes (Weiler, 1988, 1991; Snyder, 1993; Tallberg, 2002; Mbaye, 2001). In this 
analysis, I follow suit and use these data to measure the dependent variable, but do so 
with two innovations. 
The first innovation is that although the infringement data have invaluable 
information about the compliance behaviors of member states, critics of these data have 
pointed to some possible biases (Borzel, 2001). Since the infringement data are an 
indirect measure of the compliance behaviors of member states through the reaction of 
the Commission and the public, it is possible that some biases might be built into them. 
Unlike the existing studies using these data, I explicitly control the relevant biases that 
critics have pointed out. 
The second innovation is to disaggregate the data. Instead of employing the 
aggregate data of the total number of infringements including letters of formal notice, 
reasoned opinions and references to the Court that a member state gets in a given year, I 
use each instance of infringement action as the main unit of analysis. In my analysis, I 
draw on a unique data set that I have built. I collected and coded more than 11000 
individual infringement actions taken by the Commission from December 1995 to May 
2004. In a monthly journal, the Bulletin of the European Union, the Commission reports 
infringement actions against a specific country or countries about a specific legislation in 
a specific policy area. The main advantage of disaggregating the data is to gain more 
detailed information about diverse aspects of the compliance patterns of member states 
than one would get using the aggregate data. 
The explanatory variables of my analysis are the partisan preferences of national 
governments concerning the process and substance of EU rule making. In measuring the 
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partisan preferences on the process of EU rule making, I use the pro-Europeanness scores 
of political parties. In measuring the partisan preferences on the substance dimension of 
EU rule making, I employ the scores of preferences for various substantial policy 
outcomes. Instead of holistic measures like leftness-rightness, I employ much more 
specific measures, including scores for support for market economy, free enterprise, 
market regulation, depending on policy areas under consideration. 
I include a number of control variables in my empirical analysis that the existing 
literature has pointed to as relevant. Some of these variables are as follows: Influence in 
the EU rule making process, dependence of the EU, the administrative and material 
capacities of member states, socialization into EU rules and practices, domestic 
institutional variables and possible biases in the infringement data. 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
The remainder of the project will be structured into six parts. In chapter 1, I present the 
theoretical framework that I rely on in exploring the main question. Drawing on the 
insights of the relevant literatures in IR and Comparative Politics, I put forward the 
partisan politics approach to compliance in international regulatory regimes. After 
presenting and elaborating the main assumptions of the approach, I finish the chapter by 
presenting the two main hypotheses of the partisan approach. 
With Chapter 2, I move to the empirical parts of the project. In this chapter, I 
discuss the research design of the project. I present the variables of my analysis and the 
sources of data that I use to measure them, and the specific tools of analysis that I 
employ. In the following three chapters, I conduct my empirical analysis. 
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In Chapter 3, I examine the determinants of compliance across all policy areas. 
Before testing the processes and substance hypotheses of the partisan approach, I discuss 
the creation of a Europeanwide market through major policy initiatives in order to better 
operationalize the substance hypothesis of the partisan approach. After reiterating the 
process and substance hypotheses in more operational terms, I test them. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are intended to carry out further robustness tests of the partisan 
approach in more specific policy areas of practical and substantial importance. While all 
EU policies have a general market bias, they differ in terms of how much of regulation 
they introduce. Dividing EU regulatory policies into two categories, de-regulatory and re-
regulatory policies, I examine how the partisan preferences dynamics play out in each of 
these fields. In Chapter 4, I focus on the de-regulatory policies of the EU. In this chapter I 
examine what the major de-regulatory policies of the EU are, how they have originated 
and what their substantive outcomes are. Later, I empirically test the impacts of party 
preferences of national governments on compliance with EU de-regulatory policies. In 
Chapter 5, I discuss the EU re-regulatory policies. Again, I first review the major re-
regulatory policies, their causes and substantive outcomes and then empirically analyze 
the determinants of compliance with these policies. 
In the conclusion part of the project, I summarize the results of the analysis, trace 
the ramifications of these results for substantive debates in relevant literatures and 














In my effort to explore the compliance patterns of the EU member states, I draw on a 
novel theoretical approach that I call the partisan approach to international compliance. It 
is novel and revisionist in that it points to an important, but underexplored dynamic 
underlying the compliance process in the EU, the domestic distributive and allocative 
contestations as manifested through the partisan politics. The theoretical endeavor that I 
hereby engage in is guided by two premises. 
The first premise is that EU compliance is an instance of a broader process of 
international compliance. Although this assertion is agreeable to the general orientation 
prevailing in the EU compliance literature1, the literature has, with few exceptions, failed 
to build a sustained dialogue with the general literature on international compliance 
(Mbayi, 2001; Borzel, 2003; Haas, 1998). I take the EU as an international regulatory 
regime where states manage policy issues of common concern through joint actions and 
policy coordination. Although some might contest this characterization in that the EU has 
                                                 
1 Some scholars have argued that EU compliance resembles that of compliance at the domestic level and so 
suggested that we need to use the conceptual tools of comparative public policy literature, like bottom-up 
and top-approach (Guy Peters). Some others claimed that we need to bring comparative and IR literature 
(Mbayi, 2001, 2005). She developed the top-down and bottom-up versions of the managerialist and 
enforcement approaches that have dominated debates in the international compliance literature. 
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evolved into a state-like political formation2, I claim that the EU is essentially a 
regulatory regime, and the difference between the EU and other international regimes is 
not one of quality, but rather one of quantity. What sets the EU apart from other examples 
of international regulatory regimes is the degree of institutionalization that it has achieved 
with its highly robust rule-making and rule-adjudicating institutions. So, any theoretical 
framework developed to account for EU compliance ought to be applicable to other 
instances of international compliance. From the standpoint of this premise, EU 
compliance becomes less of a parochial event, as many studies in the EU compliance 
literature appear to treat it, and more of an instance of a broader process (Weiler, 1991). 
Informed by this premise, I develop a theoretical framework of a general scope of 
applicability extending beyond the EU. 
The second premise is that the understanding of EU compliance and international 
compliance in general require paying systematic attention to domestic politics. This 
premise falls along the same line with the direction that both literatures on EU 
compliance and on international compliance are currently heading. In both literatures, the 
role of the domestic political contestation on rule compliance is well recognized, yet 
undertheorized. To address this issue, I attempt to build a theoretical framework that 
rigorously establishes a causal connection between the domestic political process and the 
functioning of international regimes and compliance with their rules in particular. In 
building this connection, I venture across the fields of comparative politics (CP) and 
international relations (IR), and draw on different streams of theorizing in these fields. 
From the field of CP, I rely on theoretical insights from the literatures on partisan 
                                                 
2 Since the early 1990s, there has been a tendency to describe the EU as a political system (Hix, 1999) or 
multi-level governance (Marks & Hoogle, 2001) or different forms of the state, like the post-modern and 
the regulatory state (Caporaso, 1996) 
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politics, state theory, and public policy. From the field of IR, I rest on insights from the 
literatures on international regimes, international law, globalization and interdependency. 
The result is an analytical digging into the domestic foundations of international 
compliance, for that matter, of European compliance, where compliance with rules is not 
just a technical and legal matter, but also a rather conflict-laden process. 
In the rest of this chapter, I first discuss the existing theoretical approaches to 
international compliance and point to the need for a revisionist approach that thoroughly 
brings domestic politics into debates over international compliance. Later, I attempt to 
develop a revisionist approach that I call the partisan approach to international 
compliance. Then, I present the main propositions constituting the analytical pillars of the 
partisan approach to international compliance and the hypotheses derived from these 
propositions. 
NAVIGATING THROUGH THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL (NON) COMPLIANCE 
 
There have been various theoretical approaches in both the international compliance and 
the EU compliance literature to account for why states comply with rules made beyond 
their national boundaries. It is possible to organize the existing theoretical explanations 
and insights into four major approaches: The rationalist approach, the managerial 
approach, the normative approach and the second-image-reversed approach. While the 
first three approaches being well-elaborated in the international compliance literature take 
the state as a unitary actor, the last approach preferred more by those in the comparative 
and European compliance literatures disaggregates the state and emphasizes the relevance 
of institutional and political dynamics at the domestic level. 
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The Rationalist Approach 
Also known as the enforcement or political approach, the rationalist approach assumes 
that states are rational actors acting on the basis of the cost-benefit calculation (Tallberg, 
2001; Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996; Fearon, 1998). Like any other action that states 
take in their engagement with international system, compliance with international rules 
involves both costs and benefits. Depending on whether cost or benefit outweighs, states 
make a deliberate choice of compliance or noncompliance. Thus, compliance with 
international legal rules is a voluntary action and a matter of a choice by states (Young, 
1979; Haas, 1988; Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996). 
The proponents of this approach point to the role of defection incentives or factors 
that induce states not to comply with international rules. There are at least two types of 
defection incentive. The first defection incentive is the distance between what states 
consider as their optimal policy choices and what they in practice have to comply with 
(Fearon, 1998). At the rule-making and associating bargaining stage, states start with a 
set of policy choices that they consider least costly and most beneficial. They try to affect 
rule-making processes in such a way that policy and legal outcomes stand to their rule 
preferences as closely as possible. The farther the distance between legal or policy 
outcome and their original preference is, the more forceful the incentives to not comply 
with the resulting legal or policy are (Fearon, 1998). In this case, the cost of compliance 
with a legal commitment is a function of how far a distance there exists between legal or 
political outcomes and states’ original preferences. 
The second defection incentive is the existence of punitive or rewarding 
mechanisms in enforcing rules in a regime (Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996; Downs, 
 19
1998). Rules systems usually have a set of enforcement mechanisms applied either by an 
independent agency or those individual states participating into these systems. Punitive 
enforcement strategies are intended to increase the cost side of the cost-benefit-equation; 
rewarding enforcement strategies are designed to augment the benefits side of the 
equation. These strategies affect the costs-benefit calculations that states make in their 
choice of compliance or non-compliance. If punitive or rewarding mechanisms are not 
forceful or strong enough, states might have incentives to defect from complying with 
rules. 
The Managerial Approach 
The rationalist approach presumes that although states may or may not comply, their 
choice is voluntary and deliberate. The managerial approach, on the other hand, claims 
that compliance is not about actors’ voluntary choices, but more about their capacity 
(Chayes & Chayes, 1993, 1995). The proponents of this approach start with the 
assumption that states want to comply with international rules. By agreeing to rules in the 
first place, states express their willingness to comply with them. The source of (non) 
compliance is essentially technical rather than political. There are three decisive factors 
that the managerial approach points to as the determinants of compliance. 
The first one is the administrative and legal capacities of states. Compliance is 
likely to happen to the extent that states have necessary resources and tools (Chayes & 
Chayes, 1993, 1995). States have different degrees of material and administrative 
capacities to put policies or decisions into effect. If they do not have necessary capacities, 
they may have problems in compliance with international rules. The second variable is 
administrative efficiency. States may have a huge stock of human and material resources 
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at their disposal, but as important as the existence of these resources is how efficient they 
are in using them. States which are troubled with inefficient administrative and political 
machineries tend to have more compliance problems in that the resources necessary to 
achieve compliance are like to be diverted from the compliance process or are likely to be 
wasted. The last variable is the determinacy of rules or the clarity of rules in 
prescriptions. What might appear to be non-compliance with rules might be an instance 
of misunderstanding of what the rules require. States may have compliance problems 
because rules may not be clear about what they are supposed to do. 
The Normative Approach 
The third approach that has prevailed in the debates over rule compliance in IR is the 
normative approach (Checkel, 2001; Henkins, 1968; Franck, 1990). Like the rationalist 
approach, this approach suggests that compliance is a matter of choice. But unlike the 
rationalist approach, it argues that the basis of decision as to comply or not comply with 
international rules is not the rationalist costs and benefits calculation, but the perceived 
appropriateness of (non) compliance. This approach has roots in the constructivist strand 
of theorizing in IR, which emphasizes the role of norm, ideal and values in how states are 
related to each other and to the international system as a whole (Kratochwill, 1989; 
Checkel, 1998; Wendt, 1992, 1999; Adler, 1997). 
The exponents of the normative approach have pointed to two factors that 
determine the appropriateness of compliance with international rules. The first one is the 
legitimacy of the source of rules. The level of legitimacy that international rule making 
mechanisms enjoy decides whether states consider it appropriate to comply with rules 
deriving from them (Henkins, 1968; Franck, 1990). If states consider the source of rules 
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as illegitimate, they are likely to see compliance with its rules as inappropriate, which 
further leads to noncompliance. The second factor that the normative approach suggests 
as a determinant of compliance decisions by states is the socialization process by which 
states come to learn and internalize rules (Checkel, 2001). The appropriateness of a rule 
is buttressed by the extent that states internalize rules. The more internalized the rules to 
be complied by states are, the better compliance patterns states are likely to have. 
The Second-Image-Reversed Approaches 
While the first three approaches take the state as a unitary actor, various other theoretical 
endeavors that can be brought under the umbrella term of the second-image-reversed 
approach problematize this assumption and claim that the dynamics of domestic politics 
and their pulls and pushes account for whether international rules are complied with or 
not. 
Various studies in both the IR literature and the EU literature on compliance have 
focused on institutional and political factors at the domestic level. In the international 
compliance literature, some scholars have investigated the role of the interests of 
domestic actors in driving international compliance (Milner, 1988; Moravcsik, 1997). 
Some others have examined the relevance of institutional factors, like regime type, for 
compliance (Slaughter, 1995; Simmons, 2001b). In the EU compliance literature, 
scholars have examined the role of numerous domestic factors as the determinants of the 
compliance patterns of member states. Some of those factors are static and technical 
factors, while others are dynamic and political. Those who emphasize static and technical 
factors have pointed to the administrative dynamics and the goodness-of-the-fitness 
between the requirements of EU rules and the legal and administrative traditions of 
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member states (Knill, 1998, 2001; Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001). Those who take a 
much more dynamic approach have highlighted the role of institutional and political 
factors like veto players, interest mediation, and social movements, in the smooth 
proceeding of the compliance process (Haverland, 2000; Bailey, 2002; Duina, 1997). The 
main assertion that all second-image-reversed approaches seem to share is that 
compliance is likely to move smoothly if the prescriptions of rules to be complied with 
are compatible with existing legal and administrative practices or there is not much 
institutional and political opposition to it. 
Problems with the Existing Approaches 
While the existing approaches have shed illuminating lights upon the process of 
compliance with rules and regulations made beyond national boundaries, their 
explanatory power is trimmed by the way in which they analytically deal with the 
domestic political process. 
From the standpoints of the first three approaches- the rationalist, managerial and 
normative approaches- which have dominated debates over international compliance, , 
there is not much room for the domestic political dynamics to play a role in the process of 
rule compliance. The assumption of the state as a unitary actor that these approaches 
share renders them ill-equipped to deal with the causal role that domestic political 
dynamics could plays in the compliance process.  However, scholars who have made 
contributions to these approaches in the international literature, have recently come to 
appreciate the necessity to systematically incorporate domestic political dynamics into 
the debates on (non) compliance in international regulatory regimes (Haas, 1998; 
Simmons, 1994, 2001a; Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002). Like in the international 
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compliance literature, scholars in the EU compliance literature have recently called for 
subjecting domestic policy contestations to a rigorous analysis in terms of their impacts 
on EU compliance process (Falkner, Treid, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005; Mastenbroek, 
2005). 
While the first three approaches conceive the domestic politics as a black box, 
those approaches clustered under the name of the second-image-reversed approaches seek 
to open up this black box. But, there are some issues the second-image-reversed 
approaches. While the main problem with those who emphasize the legal and 
administrative factors is their failure to grasp the dynamic and often conflict-ridden 
nature of compliance, those who probe into the dynamic nature of compliance by 
highlighting institutional and political factors often fail to thoroughly examine the 
mechanisms connecting the domestic politics with international regimes and international 
compliance. 
Building on this background, I make a revisionist attempt. My attempt brings the 
domestic politics into debates over international compliance by opening up the black box 
of the state as a unitary actor. And it does so in a much more theoretically grounded 
manner than some of the second-imaged-reversed approaches have done. The substantial 
difference between my approach and others that take the domestic process seriously is 
that my approach aims at building the causal weight of the domestic politics in the 
compliance process based on a conception of an intrinsic connection between the 
domestic politics on the one hand and international regimes and international compliance 
on the other. 
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A REVISIONIST APPROACH: THE PARTISAN APPROACH TO 
INTERNATIONAL (NON) COMPLIANCE 
 
The partisan approach that I hereby present causally connects the domestic political 
process with its thrust as the distribution and allocation of resources and values and with 
its main expressive mechanism as the partisan politics on the one hand and compliance 
with rules and regulations in international regimes on the other. The analytical core of the 
approach could be spelt out through three major propositions, and there are at least two 
hypotheses derivable from the story as concerning the compliance process in the EU. I 
first discuss these propositions and later present the main hypotheses. 
Propositions 
In laying out the propositions that constitute the analytical pillars of the partisan approach 
to international compliance, I discuss the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of each 
of them as well as the logical connections forging them into a unified theoretical 
approach. While the first proposition shows why it is reasonable to expect that 
international compliance is bounded to evoke distributional and allocative concerns and 
thus stir contestations among social actors at the domestic level, the other two 
propositions elaborate the basic contours of these contestations and the partisan politics 
as the chief mechanism through which these contestations are channeled and translated 
into policy outcomes. 
Proposition (1): International Regimes, Public Authority, the Domestic Policy Process 
and International Compliance 
Compliance with the rules of international regimes is essentially connected to the 
domestic distribution and allocation of resources and values. 
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This proposition is based on the assumption that there is an intrinsic connection between 
the rise of international regimes on the one hand and changes in the governance capacity 
of the state in the face of the trends of interdependence and globalization on the other 
(Young, 1999). Purposively designated by the states as a patterned and rule-based 
response to the growing demand for governance beyond national boundaries, 
international regimes represent the internationalization of political authority and the 
attendant extension of the domestic policy process beyond national boundaries, the 
processes which make compliance with the rules and regulations of international regimes 
a built-in component of the domestic process of distribution and allocation of resources 
and values. 
At this point, it should be illuminating to discuss briefly some central concepts, 
like political authority and governance. Based on a Weberian understanding of authority, 
Ruggie put forward a conception of public authority as a form of political power fused 
with a social purpose (Ruggie, 1983). Power in a general sense refers to one’s ability to 
get others what they otherwise would not do in a collective situation. Social purposes 
comprise functional tasks, the performance of which has implications for the organization 
of social and economic interactions and transactions in a collective situation. Political 
power turns into authority to the extent in which it is associated with a social purpose. 
Political power and social purposes respectively define the form and content of public 
authority. While political authority is a property, the process by which it is used is called 
governance. Governance is a general social function which involves the process by which 
political power is brought to bear on socially defined purposes. There are a variety of 
ways in which this function is performed. For example, governance could be organized 
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according to the varying degrees of centralization or vary from a vertical to horizontal 
mode of structuring. 
In the modern politics, the state is the highest holder of political authority that 
provides centralized governance in a given territory. The power of the state is the 
organizational, administrative and coercive tools, resources and technologies that allow 
the state to make and effectively enforce authoritative decisions about social purposes. 
The social purposes that characterize the content and end of public authority are defined 
in the context of the state-society relations. Historically, there have three major social 
purposes that constitute the end or content of public authority that the state holds: 
Security, wealth and welfare. Security is probably the most basic of all these purposes. 
The state is expected to ensure protection of the society within its jurisdiction in the face 
of external and internal threats. Internally, protection involves containing physical 
violence among citizens and providing a degree of public order. Externally, it consists in 
defending against external military threats. Wealth is the second chief social purpose 
defining the content of the public authority embodied in the state. The state is expected to 
build, maintain or support mechanisms for creating material prosperity or wealth. Some 
functions deriving from this purpose are defining and enforcing private property rights 
and establishing and maintaining legal and political infrastructures necessary for 
economic transactions. Welfare is the last social purpose that the state as the holder of 
public authority is expected to provide by ensuring a degree of social, economic and 
ecological welfare. Some of the functions following from this purpose are to provide 
education and health services and to protect physical environment. 
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The state acquires authority to the extent that the political power that it holds 
intertwines with socially defined purposes. The state mixes political power and social 
purposes in the process of centralized and hierarchical governance. In the process, the 
state uses its political power to make authoritative decisions about substantial social 
purposes and effectively enforce them in a give territory (Weber, 1997). The mode of 
governance embodied in the modern state is not only centralized and hierarchical but also 
sovereign in that each state holds the ultimate and exclusive right to provide and organize 
governance in its own territory. In the modern politics, each state relies on its own 
organizational, human and material capacities or power in pursuing largely nationally 
defined social purposes. 
While the elaboration so far might have sounded as if the process of governance 
embodied in the modern state is consensual in that the political power is used in pursuit 
of universally defined social purposes, the process is rather conflict-ridden. Especially, 
how the social purposes are first defined as legitimate political objectives and later 
authoritatively dealt with in the governance process is often highly contested. This is so 
mainly because defining and realizing social purposes have consequences for the 
distribution and allocation of resources and values among social actors. 
The authoritative achievement of social purposes often entails using scarce 
material resources. Different types of wealth-oriented policies have different 
consequences in terms of how scarce material resources are allocated among social 
actors. For example, a wealth-oriented policy that emphasizes the well-being of 
agriculture as a crucial component of economic development and accordingly prescribes 
protection and subsidiaries for this sector has biases for the agriculture possibly at the 
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expense of other sectors. Different types of welfare policies often entail varying degrees 
of redistribution of scarce material resources. Welfare policies of varying universality 
redistributed scarce material resources social actors. 
The achievement of social purposes also involves the allocation and redistribution 
of values. Redistributive welfare policies embody different values like equality and social 
justice as well as principles organizing the allocation of citizenship rights among social 
actors. Different wealth policies are based on different conceptions of relationship 
between the state and the market. Different types of security policies are based different 
values like what the nation ought to be. 
Because of their consequences for the distribution and allocation of resources and 
values for social actors, how the nature and priority of social purposes are to be defined 
and how political power is used in achieving social purposes in the governance process 
are subject to contestations among social actors, which further constitute the crux of the 
domestic policy process (Easton, 1965). 
Having discussed the nature of public authority and of the domestic political 
process in the modern politics, the question of relevance for the purpose of this project is 
that of how they have become internationalized. I assume that the primary factors setting 
in motion the internationalization of public authority and the extension of the domestic 
policy process beyond national boundaries are the trends of interdependence and 
globalization, which have gripped much of the world with particular intensity in the last 
couple of decades (Zurn, 2002). 
The trends of interdependence and globalization are the process of the shrinkage 
of spatial and temporal dimensions of social, economic and political interactions on a 
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global scale through the emergence and thickening of networks of connections among 
different societies (Keohane, 2002). Historically, there has always been a degree of 
interdependence among societies, but the extent of interdependence obtained in the last 
decades of the twentieth century is unprecedented, and creates powerful pushes for the 
reorganization of social political and economic transactions and interactions (Held & 
McGrew, 1999). Technological and economic developments of a dramatic character have 
set the ground for these trends. Technological breakthroughs, such as revolutions in 
micro-electronics, information technology and in computers, triggered radical 
developments in communication and transportation (Held & McGrew, 2002). Buttressed 
by the technological breakthroughs, economic transactions, like trade, finance, 
investment, have become highly internationalized (Gilpin, 2001). Trade with other 
countries, which has become more global as trade barriers are removed, constitutes an 
important contributor to national wealth in my countries. Production process has become 
transnational with the foreign direct investments skyrocketing across the globe. Finance 
has become truly global with the unprecedented velocity and volume of financial 
transactions across borders. 
The mechanism through which the trends of interdependency and globalization 
have led to the internationalization of public authority and the domestic policy process is 
the expansion of the scale of social, economic, political interactions beyond national 
boundaries associating with these trends. With these expansions, the nature and 
achievement of social purposes, including security, wealth and welfare, have become 
internationalized in that how they are to be defined and achieved has come to be 
increasingly contingent on forces beyond national boundaries. There are extensive 
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researches into the internationalization of social, economic and political processes, which 
has emphasized the constraining and constitutive impacts of forces beyond national 
boundaries over social, economic and political outcomes, like economic development, 
state formation and decomposition, the nature and character of welfare provisions 
(Gourevitch, 1978, 2002; Garrett, 1999; Keohane & Miller, 1996). 
As the internationalization of the social purpose has unfolded, the power or 
governance capacity of the state as a distinct organizational and political unit appropriate 
to effectively address the social purposes and maintain independent policies has come 
under strains (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Zurn, 2002). The result is the governance crisis that 
springs from the existence of a crack between the effective domain of political power and 
the functional scope of social purposes in an increasingly globalizing and interdependent 
world (Held, 2002). While political power is largely confined to the national level, social 
purposes giving a content and legitimacy to political power have become much more 
international. 
As a response to the governance crisis that the states have founded themselves 
thrown in, a nexus of international governance has emerged (Young, 1999; Held, 2002, 
8). This nexus consists in mechanisms of “decision-making, policy coordination and 
problem-solving”, in which states internationalize political power by pooling and 
delegating to address increasingly shared social purposes. Pooling and delegating 
political power in international rule making mechanisms involve disposing these 
mechanisms with competence and resources. As the power component of public authority 
gets internationalized in international rule-making mechanisms to match the increasingly 
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internationalized social purposes, public authority, which has been the exclusive reserve 
of the state, has become internationalized. 
International regimes constitute the backbone of the growing nexus of 
international governance and thus embody the internationalization of public authority. In 
a sweeping review of the literature on international regimes Ruggie and Kratochwil 
(1986) set the problem of international governance as the substantive theme that gives a 
unity and identity to this literature. A variety of other writings on international 
governance identified international regimes as perhaps the most effective approach to the 
problem of governance compared with alternatives like a centralized government of a 
global scale (Young, 1999). As opposed to the claim that international regimes are 
antithesis to the state and the national mode of governance in that they supersede or 
replace the state (Roseanu, 1992; Ohmae, 1990; Held, 2002), scholars have shown that in 
many instances, international regimes empower states in that they allow states to 
“organize, regulate and formalize interdependence and globalization” and thus to pursue 
the internationalizing social purposes (Gilpin, 1987, 2001; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; 
Ruggie, 1983). A word of caution is necessary at this point. That various regimes have 
come to address internationalizing social purposes does not mean that the rules of these 
regimes have completely replaced states’ policies. Instead, I assume that most of the time 
regulatory frameworks of regimes complement states’ individual policies by aiming at 
making these policies much more effective. 
A variety of regimes have arisen to help states to establish governance 
mechanisms in pursuit of the internationalizing social purposes. It is possible to put these 
regimes into three broad types on the basis of substantive social purpose that they serve. 
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These types are security-oriented, wealth-oriented and welfare-oriented regimes. There is 
no need to emphasize that these types are ideal types. Most regimes incorporate two or 
three of these purposes. The United Nations (UN) is a good example of a regulatory 
framework that addresses all of these purposes. 
Security-Oriented Regimes are a response to states’ truncated capacity to deal 
with their own internal and external security on a sovereign basis (Zacher, 1992). 
Ensuring internal and external security has been the principal purpose that the state has 
conventionally been expected to perform. However, thanks to the development arm 
technologies and the conceived futility of national mode of governance, security has 
come to be defined much more internationally. The development of nuclear arms is rather 
telling in that it shows how fragile the security that the state provide to its society could 
become in the nuclear area (Hertz, 1956). The ability of a state to provide security to its 
citizens is circumvented by the security and well-being of other states. Various security 
regimes have been instituted to provide states with mechanisms to collectively deal with 
increasingly internationally defined security purposes. These arrangements could be 
functionally and geographically broad or specific. The United Nation Security Council, 
which aims at preventing wars of major scale among big powers, is an example for 
functionally and geographically broad type. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) is an example for the functionally broad but geographically specific 
arrangement. An example for the functionally specific and geographically broad 
arrangement is the Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation regimes (Haftendorn, 
Keohane & Wallander, 1999). 
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Wealth-Oriented Regimes allow states to manage the internationalization of 
mechanisms of wealth creation. As noted above, the internationalization of the 
mechanisms of wealth creation is one of the major contributors to interdependency and 
globalization. As market and its associating process, production, trade and finance, have 
become internationalized, the definition of the social purpose wealth has broadened in a 
way that the process of wealth creation has become too complicated and comprehensive 
to be handled by the state alone. A number of rule-making mechanisms have been set up 
to manage various aspects of the wealth creation processes and in fact in many cases, 
shape and reshape them. Trade is one such area. The General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade organization (WTO) is an example of a global mechanism 
to administer international trade vital for the economic well-being of various nations 
(Gilpin, 2001). There are regimes that aim at providing financial stability for the 
international market by regulating finance and monetary affairs, like International 
Monetary Fund (MF). Also, economic growth and macrostability are objects that 
international regulatory arrangements, like G8, the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and IMF are designed to address. Along with 
these regimes, there are also arrangements that establish and maintain the physical 
infrastructure necessary for economic transactions of an international scale, like the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU). 
Welfare-Oriented Regimes are designated to provide devices to address welfare 
issues that are often transnational in their origin. As security and wealth have become 
internationalized, welfare could not remain unaffected. The welfare of citizens of one 
state is conceived as contingent to the welfare of citizens of other countries, which is 
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another way of saying that the welfare purpose has become internationalized. It is 
possible to talk about three types of welfare issues: social and economical and physical. 
As far as social and economic welfare is concerned, a number of regimes have come into 
existence to codify and enforce welfare standards for people across countries. Human 
rights and torture are the main issues that regimes like UN Commission Human Rights 
take care of. The UN also targets at a number of welfare issues, like the protection and 
rights of refugees, development and poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance, 
education, culture and transboundary crime. Organizations like International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and World Health Organization (WHO), are respectively designed to 
tackle labor rights and health. As far as physical welfare is concerned, there are a number 
of conventions and regulatory frameworks addressing environmental deterioration. 
Regulatory frameworks like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), Kyoto Protocol, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and 
Montreal Protocol address the issue of climate changes. Regimes like the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Oceans and the Laws of Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the United Nation Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), 
aim at resolving issues associated with the depletion of natural resources. Also a number 
of other environmental issues, like biodiversity, waste and toxic, are tackled by 
international regulatory frameworks. 
In sum, being a response to the state’s strained governance capacity to manage 
increasingly internationalizing social purpose, the rise of international regimes involves 
internationalizing political authority with political power being pooled and delegated in 
those mechanisms in pursuit of internationalized social purposes and thus extending the 
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domestic policy process beyond national boundaries (Young, 1999; Ruggie, 1983). 
Hence, policy decisions on the security, wealth and welfare of citizens, which inexorably 
have consequences for the domestic allocation and distribution of resources and values, 
are not exclusively confined to the domestic political process, but are increasingly made 
through international rule making mechanisms. What these mean for compliance with 
rules and commitments made in these mechanisms is that compliance with the rules of 
international rule making mechanisms affect the achievement of social purposes and thus 
evokes distributional and allocative concerns among societal actors at the domestic level. 
Proposition (2):  Social Preferences and Domestic Contestation over International 
Compliance 
Due to its consequences for the domestic distribution and allocation of resources and 
values, compliance with the rules of international regulatory regimes is subject to 
domestic contestation, which is structured by diverse social preferences regarding 
process and substantive outcome of international rule making. 
If compliance with international rules is linked to the process of distribution and 
allocation of resources and values at the domestic level, it becomes subject to domestic 
contestation. I claim that domestic contestations over compliance with international rules 
and regulations are structured by diverse social preferences over international rule 
making. These preferences can be organized into two dimensions: a process dimension 
and a substance dimension. 
The process dimension is the appropriateness of international rule making 
mechanisms to address specific policy issues of distributive and allocative consequences. 
This dimension essentially concerns the extent to which societal actors conceive the 
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social purposes that regimes are designated to address as internationalized and therefore 
requiring an international mode of action. Although the need for an international mode of 
governance has become more pervasive as the strains in the governance capacities of 
states tighten, it does not go uncontested. Domestic actors have different preferences 
concerning the extent to which social purposes are internationalized or contingent on 
forces beyond national boundaries and thus require an international rather than a national 
mode of governance. These orientations are driven by general value orientations, which 
can be located on a nationalism-cosmopolitanism spectrum. Those closer to the 
cosmopolitanism end of the spectrum are likely to favor an international mode of 
governance and tend to be more supportive of compliance with international rules than 
those closer to the nationalism end of the spectrum, who are likely to support a national 
mode of governance. 
While the process dimension taps into the appropriateness of rule making 
mechanisms, the substance dimension concerns the intended policy outcomes of rules 
created through these mechanisms. Depending on how international rules affect the 
distribution and allocation of resources and values at the domestic level, societal actors 
form their preferences as to how compliant their governments ought to be in putting these 
rules into effect. Those social actors whose interests or values the substantive outcomes 
of international rules serve or reflect are likely to be more supportive of compliance with 
these rules than social actors whose interests or value stances are adversely affected by 
the intended policy outcome of these rules. 
An example should be illustrative of how preferences over the process and 
substance dimensions of international rule making affect support for compliance with 
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international rules. For example, a hypothetical regulatory regime on air pollution is a 
case to reflect on. Societal actors’ preference on the process in this case refers to whether 
the problem of air pollution is internationalized and entails an international approach of 
states coming together to take care of air pollution collectively or a national approach of 
each state handling the problem on its own. Societal actors’ preference on the intended 
policy outcome or substance is whether they agree that the goal of addressing air 
pollution itself, through either a national or an international mechanism, is an object 
worth of political and administrative investment. Societal actors’ preferences over the 
process and the substance thus determine their support for compliance with the rules of 
this regime. 
The distinction between orientation toward the process and orientation toward the 
substance might be challenged in that these orientations might drive each other. For 
example, an environmentalist might support the process of rule-making in an 
environmental regime, because these mechanisms create policies addressing 
environmental problems, not because s/he supports these mechanisms for their own sake. 
However, the literature on party positions and public opinion in the European Union 
provide ample evidence that the orientations toward the process and substance can be 
conceived as two fundamentally different aspects of the general orientation toward 
international rule making. Domestic conflicts over the EU have been shown to be 
structured along at least two dimensions: integration-sovereignty and left-right (Marks & 
Steenbergen, 2004; Hix, 1999; Gabel & Hix, 2002). This characterization closely 
matches the process-substance dimensions in the partisan framework in that while the 
former is related to the process dimension, the latter concerns the substance dimension. 
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Scholars convincingly demonstrate that individuals standing at either the left or right end 
of the left-right ideological spectrum tend to be consistently anti-European, while 
individuals at the center tend to be more pro-European (Marks & Steenbergen, 2004). 
These imply that there is theoretical possibility that an anti-European individual could 
oppose to compliance with EU rules even if the substantive outcome of the rule may 
reflect her or his substantive values and interests. 
Proposition (3): Political Parties, Partisan Choices and International Compliance 
Being the most visible and direct  intermediary between social preferences and political 
authority in modern politics, political parties aggregate and distill social preferences 
regarding the process and substance of international rule making into partisan 
orientations, and inject these orientations into the compliance patterns of governments 
that they compose. 
As domestic actors contest compliance on the basis of their diverse orientations 
concerning the process and substance dimensions, these contestations are linked to 
government's actions to comply or not through various intermediating mechanisms, like 
political parties, interests groups and social movements. Of these intermediary 
institutions, I assume political parties as the principal one. Although there are general 
debates over the decline of parties in their aggregation and representation roles, political 
parties still constitute the most direct and visible linkage between the state and society 
(Dalton, 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). The broad literature on political parties has firmly 
established that the role of political parties in aggregating and representing interests and 
values, and mediating social contestations over these interests and values into 
government actions can hardly be matched by other intermediating mechanisms 
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(Diamond & Gunter, 2001). Also, the recent literature on political parties and European 
integration provides strong evidence that political parties play a prominent role in 
representing diverse social interests and values of relevance to international rules and rule 
making mechanisms, and connecting them to policy outcomes (Gabel & Hix, 2002; 
Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002; Ray, 2003). 
I also assume that political parties are policy seekers3. Parties distill divergent 
social orientations into concrete policy objectives. Using governmental power, they seek 
to convert these policy objectives into concrete policy outcomes, and are effectively able 
to do so. In fact, the broad literature on partisan politics supports this assumption by 
providing evidence that parties are able to affect various types of policy outcomes on the 
basis of their partisan preferences (Hibbs, 1977; Garret, 1998; Boix, 1998). Likewise, I 
expect that political parties are able to bring the international compliance pattern of 
governments they compose in line with their partisan biases and programmatic 
orientations related to the process and substantive outcome of international rule making. 
The assumption that parties in government can determine the level of compliance 
might be challenged on the grounds that their ability to do so is likely be constrained by 
other political and institutional forces, like veto players. I keep this assumption for the 
sake of parsimony. However, in the empirical testing of the approach, I control for other 
domestic political and institutional forces that could possibly put constraints on parties’ 
                                                 
3 The parties-as-policy-seekers thesis has been countered by the Downsian tradition of study of political parties, which takes parties as 
office rather than policy-seekers (Downs, 1957). However, the Downsian thesis of parties as office-seekers has been challenged on 
both empirical and theoretical levels (Riker, 1962; Stokes, 1963; Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge, 1994). It has been claimed that 
parties are essentially policy-seekers, but they have to act under political and institutional constraints forcing them to act more as 
office-seekers (Laver & Budge, 1992). 
 40
ability to affect government compliance patterns on the basis of their partisan 
orientations. 
Hypotheses 
There are at least two main hypotheses derivable from the partisan politics approach, 
each of which respectfully concerns the process and substantive outcome dimensions of 
EU rule making. 
The Process Hypothesis: 
Governments with a more favorable stance toward European integration and a European 
mode of governance are likely to display a better performance in international 
compliance than governments with a less favorable stance. 
The Substance Hypothesis: 
Governments with a more favorable stance toward the intended policy outcome or 
substance of European rule making are likely to comply with these rules better than 
governments with a less favorable stance. 
SUMMARY 
In this part of the project, I have attempted to theorize the impact of the domestic politics 
and policy contestations on EU compliance and International compliance in general. 
After reviewing the main theoretical alternatives, I identified the lack of an attempt to 
systematically theorize the impact of the domestic political dynamics on compliance 
across alternative theoretical currents as a common limitation across these alternatives. 
While the rationalist, managerialist and ideational approaches treat the domestic politics 
as a black box, the second-image-reversed approaches either focus mostly on technical 
and legal at the domestic level or fail to fully elaborate causal connections linking the 
 41
domestic politics to international compliance. In my theoretical endeavor, I tried to 
systematically connect the domestic political process with its main dynamic as the 
distribution and allocation or resources and values and with its main expressive 
mechanism as the partisan politics on the one hand and international compliance on the 
other. After establishing that international compliance is bound to evoke distributional 
and allocative concerns and to be subject to domestic contestation, I identified two 
dimensions of these contestations, the process and substantive outcome dimensions. I 
claim that the partisan politics as the principal reflective mechanism of these 
contestations allow these contestations to feed into the process of compliance with 
international rules. 
Deriving two hypotheses from the partisan approach to international compliance 
regarding the compliance patterns of the governments of member states, I will test these 
hypotheses in the empirical analyses in the following chapters. I start the empirical 
analyses with the next chapter, chapter 2, where I present the variables, data and the 





















In the previous chapter, I discussed alternative theoretical currents available to account 
for why EU member states may vary in their patterns of compliance with EU rules and 
regulations. Also, I presented my revisionist approach, the partisan politics approach to 
international compliance, which, I claim, incorporates the domestic politics into EU 
compliance and, for that matter, international compliance much more thoroughly than 
any other alternative explanations. The partisan politics approach yielded two hypotheses, 
the process and substance hypotheses. Starting with this chapter, I subject these 
hypotheses to a set of rigorous empirical testing. 
While the partisan approach is tailored to explicate the compliance process across 
all instances of international compliance, the EU represents what is methodologically 
called as the most likely case where this approach must stand confirmed. This is so 
mainly because all of the premises of the partisan approach, which also constitute the 
boundary conditions of this approach, conspicuously hold in the case of the EU, perhaps 
much more markedly than in any other instance of international regimes. 
The main assumption underlying the first premise that there is an intrinsic 
connection between the rise of international regimes and heightening strains in the 
governance capacity of the state has been stated in various disguises in the theoretical and 
empirical writings on the EU. The EU is conceived as a highly advanced regulatory 
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regime (Majone, 1994, 1996). Over more than half a century, the EU has displayed a 
degree of robustness in making rules and regulations to meet the provision of 
Europeanized social purposes in its member states that one would hardly see in other 
examples of international regimes. Like other regimes, the EU had deep roots in changes 
in the governance capacity of its constituting states in performing basic social purposes, 
especially wealth and security. This notion has been articulated in various historical and 
theoretical accounts of European integration. 
In his historical analysis of the origin of European integration, Milward pointed to 
the embeddedness of European integration in the evolution of the nation state (Milward, 
1992). He demonstrated how the EU became an intrinsic force in the post-war 
reconstruction of the European nation states, which had emerged devastated from two 
world wars and the Great depression in between them and even ventured to call the EU as 
the “European rescue of the nation state”. The European states, he claims, had proven 
incapable of providing the most basic social purposes, like security and prosperity. In the 
aftermath of WWII, there was a generalized sense that social purposes in European states 
had already become Europeanized in that the definitions and achievement of security, 
wealth and welfare in a European state were perceived as highly contingent on 
developments in others. Most of the reconstruction policies that the post-war states 
embarked on required internationalizing or, in this case, Europeanizing political power 
(Milward, 1992). The EU represents the process of Europeanizing political power that 
enabled its member states to pursue the security and wealth of their citizens much more 
effectively. 
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The notion that European integration is an integral part of the evolution of the 
nation state in Europe echoes not only in the historical accounts of the origin of European 
integration, but also in competing theoretical approaches to European integration. There 
are two major theoretical approaches to European integration: the neo-functionalism and 
liberal intergovernmental approaches. That European integration had roots in governance 
problems that the state has had in managing functional tasks constitutes the starting point 
for the neo-functionalist approach (Haas, 1958). Haas claimed that with the growing 
scope of functional tasks that the state is expected to perform, the state has proven 
incapable of performing these tasks. The EU represents a movement to a higher form of 
political organization, which holds a greater potential in performing these tasks than the 
state. 
Being the leading exponent of the liberal intergovernmental approach, Moravcsik 
convincingly showed that European integration was driven by the domestic forces of 
member states that perceived of integration as necessary in attaining public goods 
(Moravcsik, 1998). This perspective presumes two stages in the integration process. The 
first stage involves the emergence of the push for integrative or disintegrative policies the 
state-society relations. In the second stage, this push is mediated through a series of 
intergovernmental negotiations. This approach emphasizes the connection between the 
possibility and form of attaining social purposes and European integration. 
Having its roots in the Europeanization of social purposes and the attendant 
constraints in the governance capacity of the European states, the EU has expanded its 
jurisdictions since its inception in the early 1950s. In the process, the three major social 
purposes, including wealth welfare and security, that the state is expected to address, 
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have become Europeanized (Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; Hix & Goetz, 2001). 
Today, almost 80 percent of all regulatory policies applicable in member states have 
proceeded through the EU decision-making processes (Hix, 1999: 211). As a result, it is 
hardly possible to understand the processes of distribution and allocations of resources 
and values in member states without referring to the EU and its rule-making and rule-
adjudicating mechanisms (Laffan, 1996; Niedermayer & Sinnott, 1995; Risse, 1996, 
Sbragia, 1992; Schmitter, 1996; Wessels, 1997; Tsebelis, 2000). What all these imply is 
that compliance with EU rules and regulations is most likely to evoke distributional and 
allocational contestations in member states. 
As far as the second premise that compliance with rules is subject to contestation, 
which is structured along the preferences over the process and substance dimensions of 
rule making goes, the possibility and dimensions of contestation over EU compliance are 
elaborated in the growing debates over European integration and political conflict. 
Associating with the growing Europeanization of the policy processes of member states is 
the increasing politicization of the EU, which manifests in the rising prominence and 
intensity of domestic contestations over the EU (Hix, 1999; Gabel & Hix, 2002; Marks & 
Steenbergen, 2004). They have argued that domestic contestations over the EU are 
structured along at least two dimensions: integration-sovereignty and left-right (Marks & 
Steenbergen, 2004; Hix, 1999; Gabel & Hix, 2002). While the former refers to whether 
there should be more or less integration, the latter refers to equality-justice division. This 
characterization closely matches the process-substance dimension in the partisan 
framework in that while the former is related to the process dimension, the latter concerns 
the substance dimension. 
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In terms of the third premise, which points out the centrality of political parties 
and the partisan politics in mediating contestation over compliance, there also seem to be 
confirmatory implications in the literature on political parties and European integration. 
Scholars have rigorously elaborated the role of the parties in mediating and structuring 
the debates on the EU (Gabel & Hix, 2002; Ray, 2003; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002). 
Their elaborations have revealed the myriad ways in which political parties affect 
European integration. Political parties not only shape the orientation of their national 
governments toward the EU and EU policies, but also determine the functioning of the 
EU institutions in either direct or subtle ways, like the European Parliament, the Council 
of Ministers and the European Commission (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hooghe, 2001). 
The generalized importance of national political parties at different stages of 
integration gives a reasonable expectation that national parties and partisan politics play a 
non-negligible role in EU compliance. In fact, there is some anecdotal evidence for the 
claim that compliance with EU rules stirs partisan contestations. In recent years, partisan 
contestations over compliance with EU rules are particularly well-reported in the area of 
social policy (Treid, 2003; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005). Evidence suggests 
that the compliance patterns of the national governments of a number of member states 
have altered with the changing partisan composition of their national government. 
The case of the UK is particularly interesting. When the EC/U first initiated its 
most systematic incursions into the domain of social policy in the second half of the 
1980s, the neo-conservative and strongly Euroskeptic Thatcher government took a 
strongly reactive position. When those incursions amounted to the declaration of Social 
Charter, the Thatcher government refused to sign it. When other EU governments agreed 
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to incorporate the Social Charter into the EU legal framework in the processes leading to 
the Maastricht Treaty, John Major, the then leader of the Conservative-led government, 
did not agree. Due to the resistance of the Major government, the Social Charter was 
incorporated into the EU legal system in the form of Social Protocol, which created an 
awkward situation that most EU social policies did not apply to the UK. The 
Conservative government delayed compliance with a number of legislations related with 
social policy, like Working Time Directives, Parental Leave Directives and Employment 
Contract Information Directives. The leaders of the Conservative government, Thatcher 
and Major, did not refrain from explicitly justifying their opposition to EU social policies 
on the basis of their anti-European and neo-liberal policy position (Leibfried & Pierson, 
1995). 
However, the rise of the Labor Party in 1996 changed the British pattern of 
compliance in the area of social policy. In fact, one of the campaign promises of the 
Labor Party was to improve the compliance record of the UK in this area. First of all, the 
Labor government ended the awkward situation resulting from the Social Protocol of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Thus, with the Labor party agreeing to the policy principles and 
objectives in the Social Protocol, the Social Protocol was fully incorporated into the 
Treaty system with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. There was also discernable 
improvement in the compliance with specific social policy legislations, like the Working 
Time, Parental Leave and Employment Contract Information Directives, which are 
designed to address the adverse welfare effects of economic integration. Like the 
Conservative party, the Labor Party justified its compliance record on the basis of its 
much more pro-European and more leftist oriented ideology (Treid, 2003). 
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The similar patterns of a change in compliance record of a member state as a 
result of a change in the partisan composition of the country have been reported in other 
member states. For example, Germany had serious delaying problems in compliance with 
specific social policy legislations, like Parental Leave Directive, under the conservative-
liberal Kohl government. The accession of the Schroeder government in 1998 cleared the 
problem of delay. Likewise, the transposition and enforcement of social policies in other 
countries, like Denmark, Italy and Netherland, have been a subject of intense partisan 
conflict (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005). 
Overall, given that the boundary conditions of the partisan approach embody 
rather conspicuously in the EU case, or perhaps more so than any other example of an 
international regime, the EU represents one of the most likely cases where the partisan 
framework of international compliance is expected to show up particularly well. In my 
analysis, I expect that the governments of member states with different partisan 
preferences related to the process and substantive outcome of European rule making are 
likely to exhibit different (non) compliance patterns. In the rest of the chapter, I present 
the variables and data of the analysis (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005). 
VARIABLES AND DATA 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of my analysis is the compliance patterns of EU member states 
across policy areas with different distributive and allocative consequences. International 
compliance is generally defined as the conformity of states’ behaviors to rules and 
regulations (Raustiala & Maria- Slaughter, 2002). Scholars have noticed that compliance 
and non-compliance do not represent a dichotomy, but a continuum; there is a wide 
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spectrum of possibilities between compliance and non-compliance, like partial and late 
compliance (Young, 1979). 
To measure how well member states comply with EU rules, I refer to their 
behaviors in what is known as the infringement procedure. Although the EU institutions 
are vested with the capacity to formulate rules and regulations, they do not have the 
bureaucratic capacity to implement or enforce these rules. Practically, the implementation 
of rules is carried out by the governments of each member state. The European 
Institutions, especially the Commission and the European Court of Justice, are involved 
in the enforcement process through a specifically designed procedure called the 
Infringement procedure. 
The Infringement procedure has a legal foundation in three Articles of the 
Founding Treaties, ECT Article 10, 226 and 227 (ex Article 5, 169 and 170). The 
Founding Treaties established the European Commission as the guardian of the Treaties. 
ECT Article 10 stipulates that the European Commission is to make sure that “member 
states take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of 
their obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the 
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s 
tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainments of the 
objectives of this Treaty” (ECT Article 10, ex Article 5).  ECT Article 226 and 227 (Ex 
Articles 169 and 170) explicitly establish a specific mechanism which assigns to the 
Commission and member states the responsibility to make sure that no Member state 
comply with EU rules. ECT Article 226 defines infringement as the “failure to fulfill 
obligations” that flow from different sources of law, like Treaties, directives, regulations 
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and decisions. In case of suspected infringement of EU rules, ECT Articles 226 and 227 
authorize the Commission to first send a reasoned opinion on the matter and then, if the 
member state does not comply, bring the matter before the Court of Justice. 
Here is how the procedure works in practice. If the Commission suspects a 
possible infringement by a member state in its own inspections or on the basis of 
complaints instigated by private and public actors, it sends a letter of formal notice to that 
country. The member state is expected to return a report to the Commission about the 
suspected infringement. Sending a letter of formal notice is a common procedure, which 
has come to be a routine practice by the Commission even when there is no suspicion of 
infringement (Borzel, 2001). In fact, the ECT Article 226 and 227 do not even mention 
the letter of formal notice. But, the Commission uses this practice to signal a message to 
member states about looming deadlines in complying with EU rules as well as to get the 
first sense of if there might be a possible infringement.  If the member state does not 
notify the Commission within a given time set by the Commission itself, the Commission 
can send a reasoned opinion, in which it lays out why it suspects a possible infringement.  
If the member state does not comply within the given time period set by the Commission, 
the last resort is reference to the European Court of Justice. According to the official 
reports issued by the Commission, member states vary in terms of the frequency of their 
appearances at the different stages of the infringement procedure, which suggests that 
they differ in their patterns of compliance with EU rules. 
National variations in the frequency of appearance at each stage of the 
infringement procedure have been used by a number of studies in the EU compliance 
literature for illustrative and explanatory purposes (Weiler, 1988, 1991; Snyder, 1993; 
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Tallberg, 2002; Mbaye, 2001). In this analysis, I use these data to measure compliance, 
but do so with two innovations. Although the infringement data have invaluable 
information about the compliance behaviors of member states, the critics of these data 
have pointed to some possible biases. They claim that these biases are related to the fact 
that the infringement data measure compliance indirectly through the reactions of the 
Commission and the publics (Borzel, 2001). The first innovation is that, unlike the 
existing studies using these data, I explicitly control for the biases that the critics have 
pointed out. In the control variable section below, I discuss what these biases are and how 
I control them. 
The second innovation is to disaggregate the data. Instead of employing the 
aggregate data of the total number of infringement actions, including letters of formal 
notice, reasoned opinions and references to the Court, which a member state gets in a 
given year, I use each instance of infringement action as the main unit of analysis. In my 
analysis, I draw on a unique data set that I have built. I collected and coded more than 
11000 individual infringement actions taken by the Commission from December 1995 to 
May 20044. In a monthly journal, the Bulletin of the European Union, the Commission 
reports infringement actions against a specific country or countries about a specific 
legislation in a specific policy area. The main advantage of disaggregating the data is to 
gain more detailed information about diverse aspects of the compliance patterns of 
member states than one would get using the aggregate data. 
In coding the dependent variable, I attribute different values to appearances at 
each stage of the infringement procedure in terms of the severity of compliance problems 
                                                 
4 There are no substantive reasons to cover specifically these periods. For the purpose of the 
current project, I stop collecting the data on infringement actions after May 2004 when 10 new 
member states joined the EU. 
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that they signify that member states are likely to have. As noted previously, the 
infringement procedure is a sequence of stages, through which the possible violations of 
EU rules are suspected, scrutinized and litigated. What starts off as a potential instance of 
infringement at the letter of formal notice stage turns into a substantiated judgment about 
the violation of EU rules and regulations at the stage of reference to the court (Snyder, 
1993; Evans, 1979; Weiler, 1991). In the process, the Commission keeps a series of 
informal or formal communications with member states about the existence and nature of 
suspected infringements and ways to rectify them. From the early stage of letter of formal 
notice to the late stage of reference to the Court stage, member states have a number of 
opportunities to either establish that the suspected instance of infringement does not have 
an actual basis or to take actions to correct it. One can infer that the later a case appears in 
the process, the more substantial and severe compliance issues it is likely to involve. 
What this suggests is that appearances at the different stages of the infringement 
procedure carry different weights in terms of signaling the severity or, even in some 
cases, the existence of compliance problems in member states. So, I code the different 
stages of the infringement procedure in terms of the severity of compliance problems that 
they imply that member states are likely to have: The appearance on the letter of formal 
notice stage is coded as low severity, the appearance at the reasoned opinion stage as 
medium severity and the appearance at the references to the Court stage as high severity. 
Predicting the highest level reached by a dispute aggravate the potential problem 
of overrepresentation of severe cases. In other words, there is likely to be a problem of 
overrepresentation in the data set of hard or severe cases reaching to the later stage of the 
infringement procedure, compared to routine cases that are settled at the first stage of the 
 53
infringement procedures. Although this problem is present in aggregate data as well, it 
becomes more acute in disaggregated data. I checked my data set for the 
overrepresentation problem and identified 1398 cases which appeared at multiple stages 
of the procedure (out of 11812 cases). Before I ran the analyses, I removed the early 
appearances of these cases so that all cases in the data set appear only once. 
Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables of my analysis are the partisan preferences of the national 
governments concerning the process and substantive outcome of EU rule making. In 
measuring these variables, I use data from the Manifesto Survey Group (MSG) studies. 
The MSG studies utilized party manifestos, platforms and government declarations to 
chart the partisan preferences of political parties across 19 democracies covering the EU 
countries included in my analysis (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara & Tanenbaum, 
2001; Budge, Roberson & Hearl, 1987). The data provide the most comprehensive 
examination of partisan preferences across 54 issue dimensions. A growing body of 
literature has made use of these data to study a variety of questions, like government 
expenditure and coalition formation (Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara & Tanenbaum, 
2001; Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge, 1994; Laver & Budge, 1992). 
In measuring the partisan preferences on the process of EU rule making, I use the 
pro-Europeanness scores of political parties. The MSG studies create scores for the 
percentage of favorable and unfavorable statements about European integration in 
manifestos. My measure is the ratio of positive mentions of EC/EU to total number of 
mentions of EC/EU. Scholars have found that the Manifesto measure of pro-
Europeanness generally correlates with the other measures of pro-Europeanness, like 
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expert surveys (Ray, 1999; Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen & Bakker, 2004). In measuring 
the partisan preferences on the substance dimension of EU rule making, I employ the 
scores of preferences for various substantial policy outcomes. Instead of holistic 
measures like leftness-rightness, I employ much more specific measures, including scores 
for supports for market economy, free enterprise and market regulation, depending on 
policy areas under consideration. The overall partisan position of a government on the 
process and substance of EU rule making is calculated as a weighted score, which takes 
into account the influence of each party by including the percentage of cabinet position 
occupied by this party. The standard formula I use to calculate the overall government 
partisan preferences is as follows: 
Government Partisan Preference= Σ (P1pref*P1prop)+(P2pref*P2prop)+…+( 
Pipref*Piprop) 
 Where  
P1pref = Preference score of Party 1 
P1prop= Proportion of cabinet position occupied by Party 1 
P2pref = Preference score of Party 2 
P2prop = Proportion of cabinet position occupied by Party 2 
Pipref = Preference score of Party i 
Pi1prop= Proportion of cabinet position occupied by Party i 
Control Variables 
I include a number of control variables in my empirical analysis, which derive from the 
alternative theoretical approaches to international compliance, like the rationalist, 
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managerial, normative and second-image-reversed approaches. The following are their 
descriptions and the sources of data. 
Influence in the EU Rule Making Process: 
This variable derives from the rationalist approach, which emphasizes the cost-benefit 
calculations in the compliance process. It is possible that some member states have more 
severe compliance issues, because they have lost the policy battle in the rule making 
process (Tallberg, 2002; Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, 1996; Fearon, 1998). In other word, 
if member states were not able to steer the outcome of the rule making process toward 
ideal policy positions, they might not be willing to comply with the resulting rules. The 
influence member states can bring in policy bargaining is likely to affect their patterns of 
behaviors later in the compliance process. I take their weighted votes in the Council of 
Ministers as a measure for the influence of member states in the EU rule making process 
(Hix, 1999). Although there are debates on using the weighted votes in the Council as a 
predictor of policy outcomes (Garrett & Tsebelis, 2001), this is perhaps the best 
approximation to the potential or actual influence that the governments of member states 
can bring into the EU rule making process (Holler & Windgren, 1999). 
Dependence on the EU: 
Compliance with EU rules and regulations might also be related to how dependent 
member states are on the EU. Since the member states whose economies are more reliant 
on the EU have more to lose from the poor working of EU rules, they have more 
incentives to comply with EU rules than the member states, which are less reliant on it. 
To measure the dependency of member states on the EU, I use the intra-EU trade data as 
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provided in the European Economic Report by the European Commission. These data 
take intra-EU trade as a percentage of the total trade of a member state. 
Material Capacity: 
Inspired by the managerial approach to international compliance (Chayes, A. & Chayes, 
1993, 1995; Raustiala, K. & Slaughter, 2002), some analysts have suggested that member 
states have varying material capacities to put EU rules into effect (Falkner, Treid, 
Hartlapp, & Leider, 2005; Mbaye, 2001; Mastenbroek, 2003; Bursens, 2002). If member 
states do not have necessary capacities, they are likely to have problems in compliance 
with EU rules. I use two indicators to measure the material capacities of member states. 
The first measure is GDP per capita, which captures the overall availability of material 
resources for state and societal actors. The second measure is the total government 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, which show how much of the material resources are 
effectively at the command of governments. 
Socialization: 
The compliance patterns of member states are also likely to be determined by learning 
dynamics or the extent to which member states are accustomed to EU rules and practices 
(Checkel, 2001). The socialization thesis has its theoretical underpinning from the 
normative approach that highlights the role of learning and ideational factors in the 
compliance process. The member states more socialized into EU rules and regulations are 
likely to have a better compliance records than the member states less socialized, because 
they are more familiar with rules to be complied and practices and customs to be 
followed in the compliance process. Assuming that the extent of socialization into EU 
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rules and customs is strongly associated with the time spent in the EU, I include the 
membership age variable to test the socialization thesis. 
Other Domestic Institutional and Political Variables: 
As noted in the presentation of the theoretical approach, I assume that parties in 
government can determine the level of compliance without a major impediment from 
their political and institutional environment. This assumption may be found too simplistic 
in that it is possible that parties' ability to determine compliance might be constrained by 
their political and institutional environment. In my analysis, I control for other domestic 
political and institutional factors that can possibly affect international compliance. 
Scholars working within the second-image-reversed tradition suggested a variety of other 
domestic factors. 
Since compliance often requires legal and political changes, domestic institutional 
and political factors decide the possibility and pace of these changes or act as veto 
players whose consent political and legal changes depend (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002; 
Haverland, 2000; Bailey, 2002). One variable of relevance is judicial review. Judicial 
review potentially makes it harder for the executive to carry out legal and political 
changes entailed in compliance. I use a judicial review index as reported by Lane and 
Ersson (1999). Also significant is the territorial distribution of political power or the 
degree of decentralization. It is plausible to argue that the member states where sub-
national actors have a strong influence in determining the scope and character of legal 
and political changes, compliance is much more likely to be cumbersome and uncertain. I 
use the decentralization score of member states with the higher scores signifying more 
decentralization (Lane and Ersson, 1999). One can also expect that the type of legislature 
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matters in that EU compliance involves active engagement of the legislative branch 
especially in the transposition of EU rules into national legal systems. So, compliance is 
expected to be more difficult in bicameral systems than in unicameral systems. I employ 
the bicameralism index of Lane and Errson (Lane and Ersson, 1999). 
Compliance also depends on the cooperation of domestic private actors. 
Corporatism is conceived as highly conducive to compliance, because a formalized and 
regularized access to private interests as provided by the corporatist mode of interest 
mediation allows governments to obtain the consent of private interests that might be 
necessary for compliance with European rules (Duina, 1999). In order to measure the 
corporatism variable, I used a corporatism index created by Lane and Ersson (1999). The 
higher the corporatist score of a member state, the less problems it is likely to have in EU 
compliance. 
One another variable of relevance is the coalition status of governments. Coalition 
governments are likely to be troubled by disagreements and even stalemates over whether 
or how EU rules are to be complied, which is likely to slow down the pace of the 
compliance process. 
Possible Biases in the Infringement Data: 
As noted previously, the infringement data that I am drawing on have been subject to 
criticisms for possible biases built into the infringement procedure (Borzel, 2001; 
Falkner, Treid, Hartlapp, & Leider, 2005). Critics have argued that the empirical patterns 
revealed in the infringement data reflect how the Commission and the public approach to 
possible infringements rather than how well member states actually comply (Borzel, 
2001). While the critics have a point, they run risk of throwing out the baby with the bath 
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water. There is invaluable information contained in the infringement data, which would 
otherwise be very difficult to collect. In this project, unlike the existing literature 
employing these data, I control for some of the biases that the outspoken critics of the 
infringement data have suggested. 
First of all, the Commission might treat some countries differently. The southern 
European countries do not have a good reputation in terms of their compliance practices. 
Scholars and practitioners have argued that non-compliance in the EU compliance 
process is largely a southern phenomenon or what some like to call a “southern problem” 
(Borzel, 2003). The Commission might keep a closer eye on the compliance practices of 
the southern European countries: Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. I use a dummy for 
the southern European countries to control this possible bias. The Commission may also 
treat member states differently in that the member states making larger contributions to 
the EU budget might get a more favorable treatment than the member states making less 
contributions. To control this bias, I use the member state budget contributions as a 
percentage of the EU budget. Also, it has been argued that there is a growing trend in the 
number of infringements, reflecting the growing body of rules, with which member states 
have to comply with. I use a time counter to capture any trend. 
According to the critics of the infringement data, another source of possible biases 
in the data is the citizens of member states on whose initiatives the Commission often 
depends to detect potential infringement cases (Borzel, 2001). To eliminate these threats 
to the validity of my results, I use a series of control variables, total population, life 
satisfaction, distrust in national government and support for more speedy integration. The 
member states with larger populations might receive more infringement actions than the 
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member states with less population, simply because there are more people to complain. 
Citizens might vary in their assertiveness about how their governments comply with EU 
rules. There are at least three factors that decide how assertive publics could become. One 
is overall life satisfaction of the public. In cases where publics have low overall 
satisfaction, they might be more likely to complain about whatever their governments do. 
Likewise, if publics do not trust in their national government, they might be more willing 
to come out and criticize their governments’ compliance practices. Also important is their 
support for European integration, which I measure as the desired speed of integration 
minus the perceived speed of integration. The more supportive they are of integration, the 
more vigilant they are likely to be in observing the compliance performances of their 
governments. I use the aggregate Eurobarometer data to measure these public attitudes. 
Another possible challenge to the infringement data is that although most 
infringement problems are captured in the Commission's infringement data, there might 
be other instances that are not covered by the data. Scholars have noticed that along with 
the Commission, there is another venue, through which infringements get revealed and 
resolved. That venue is the national courts using the tool of a preliminary ruling, where 
the courts request the ECJ to interpret and clarify EU rules and regulations (Stone Sweet 
& Brunell, 1998). To control for possible infringement cases processed through this 
venue rather than through the Commission, I use the number of preliminary rulings that 
the courts of a member state request from ECJ in a year. 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the variables, their descriptions and the sources 
of data used to measure them. 
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THE MODE OF ANALYSIS 
The empirical analyses ascertaining the patterns of the behaviors of member states in the 
EU compliance process employ statistical tools. As noted previously, one of the promises 
of this study is to utilize large-N quantitative methods to the possible fullest extent. The 
EU compliance literature has predominantly relied on qualitative methods, while the 
possibly vast potential of quantitative methods remains largely unrealized. It is by no 
means to say that the qualitative methods have not made much contribution to filling the 
black hole in our understanding of the EU compliance process. Most of the existing 
hypotheses have been generated through case studies and focused or structured 
comparisons. These methods have served not only in formulating hypotheses, but also in 
testing them. For instance, the goodness-of-fitness hypothesis, which was once the most 
influential explanation for EU compliance, has been discredited through structured 
comparisons (Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp & Leiber, 2005; Mastenbrok, 2005). What it is 
instead to say is that the edge that one would gain in using large-N quantitative methods 
is to add a little bit more rigor in hypothesis testing. 
The specific statistical tools that employ in ascertaining the compliance patterns 
of EU member states are the Ordered Logit Statistical techniques to get empirical results 
and simulation tools to illustrate my results. My choice of the Order Logit is dictated by 
the measurement of my dependent variable. The Ordered Logit is an appropriate tool 
because the compliance patterns of the EU member states are coded as ordinal, reflecting 
different degrees of the severity of compliance issues that member states are likely to 
have, like low, medium and high. Once I get my results, I will use Monte Carlo 
simulation techniques that come with a software program called as CLARIFY to better 
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illustrate how the variables of interests affect the dependent variable (King, Tomz & 
Wittenberg, 2000). 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I presented the research design, variables and data of the empirical 
analyses that I run in the next three chapters. I argue that because of its highly robust and 
politicized nature, the EU represents perhaps the most likely case where the partisan 
approach must be confirmed. Using the infringement date set that I built up, and 
employing the tools of large-N statistical design, I test the process and substance 
hypotheses of the partisan approach in accounting for the compliance patterns of member 
states first across all policy areas in chapter 3 and later across specific policy areas, de-
regulatory policies in chapter 4 and re-regulatory policies in chapter 5. As far as the 
process dimension is concerned, I expect the governments with more support for the EU 
to display a better compliance pattern than the governments with less support. As far as 
the substance hypothesis goes, I expect that the governments with more support for the 
substance of EU rules and regulations are likely to be more compliant than the 























In the previous chapters, I presented and elaborated the partisan approach to EU rule 
compliance, and laid down the research design for testing this approach. With this 
chapter, I begin the presentation of empirical analyses. I test the partisan approach at 
aggregate and disaggregate levels. Analysis at the aggregate level involves predicting 
compliance across all policy areas without making distinctions among them. Analysis at 
the disaggregate level consists in predicting compliance in two distinct policy areas of 
analytical and practical importance: de-regulatory and re-regulatory policies. This chapter 
does empirical testing at the aggregate level. 
The partisan approach yielded two main hypotheses, which respectively concern 
the impacts of different partisan orientations toward the process and substantive 
outcomes of the EU rule making process on compliance with EU rules. The process 
hypothesis is straightforward: the governments with a more favorable stance toward the 
European rule making process are expected to be more compliant than the governments 
with a less favorable position. However, the substance hypothesis is not as clear. In order 
to fully grasp how the second hypothesis applies in the EU context, one needs to identify 
a fundamental policy goal underlying EU rules and regulations. 
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This chapter has three sections. In the first section, I provide a general discussion 
of the main goals of EU regulatory policies in order to better operationalize the second 
hypothesis. I conclude this section by reformulating the second hypothesis with reference 
to the more specifically defined objectives of EU regulatory policies. The orientation in 
this section is holistic in that I examine the overarching objectives that permeate all of 
EU regulatory policies. In the second section, I empirically test the two hypotheses of the 
partisan politics approach. I wrap the chapter up with remarks summarizing the main 
findings. 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS A MARKET BUILDING PROJECT 
It would not be far-fetched to claim that the most conspicuous outcome of over a half a 
century of European integration is the Single Market with economic and monetary union. 
Although European integration has always had political objectives, like peace and 
stability, and political unification, the integration project has had a strong economic 
overtone (Milward, 1992; Moravcsik, 1998). Practically, economic objectives have 
driven and given much of the substance to the major regulatory policies of the EU. 
Therefore, exploring the overarching goals that permeate EU rules and regulations 
inextricably leads one into the domain of economics. The major policy initiatives that 
constitute the milestones of European integration were imbued with the principles of 
market economy (Wise & Gibb, 1993; Gillingham, 2003; Smith, 2004). It is safe to claim 
that the overarching objective that gives the substance to the specific regulatory policies 
of the EU is to build a competitive market economy across Europe. 
The European markets had long remained fragmented into separate units, the 
boundaries of which were defined by nation states (Overturf, 1988; Jovanovic, 1997). 
 65
The fragmentation was solidified by different forms and intensities of state interventions 
into economic and social life. State interventions occur in various forms, like public 
procurements and corporations, taxes, subsidies, regulations and standards. There are 
various motivations behind state intervention in economic life. Whatever the specific 
motivation, their existence shows that economic interactions are embedded in social and 
political life (Polanyi, 1945). Driven by different motivations, various forms of state 
interventions have determined the access of products and factors of productions of 
foreign origin to their markets and thus, from a strictly economic point of view, created 
distortions in the flow of products and factors. Also, differences in macro-economic, 
monetary and fiscal, policies create uncertainties and increase transaction costs. 
The fragmented state of European economies was one of the fundamental reasons 
for the exhausting conflicts and wars among European states (Milward, 1992). Convinced 
that the path to peace and stability on the war-torn continent passes by reducing 
fragmentation through an increasing cooperation and even integration of their economies, 
European states pursued the goal of the progressive elimination of economic boundaries 
that kept them divided when their fates were so much intertwined (Milward, 1992; 
Moravcsik, 1998). European economic integration and its regulatory policies have been 
driven by the goal of overcoming the segmented nature of European markets, and of 
creating a larger market economy characterized by the freedom of  products (goods, 
services) and the factors of production (capital and labor) (Molle, 1990: 5, 9). 
The pattern of the evolution of European integration closely follows the logic of 
economic integration that political economy scholars have identified (Molle, 1990). Some 
of these theories are the theory of custom union, theory of economic integration, theory 
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of optimum currency areas (Viner, 1950; Ballassa, 1961; Mundell, 1971).5 These theories 
show that an integrated or enlarged market has a huge potential in terms of raising 
prosperity. With restrictive and discriminatory practices, physical, financial and human 
resources are allocated at a sub-optimal level. In other words, factors and products do not 
flow to where they would yield their highest return. With increasing market integration, 
the productive potential of economic actors is expected to increase. The attendant 
unleashing of competitive forces and the growing scale of economies are likely to lead to 
diversification and specialization where factors are allocated where they are most 
efficient (Molle, 1990). 
Balassa, in his classical treatment of international economic integration among the 
distinctly demarcated national markets, divided the process in different stages (Balassa, 
1961). The first stage is the Free Trade Area. In this designation, two countries agree to 
remove tariffs and quantitative restrictions in trade flow, while they act independently in 
their transactions with the third country. In the second stage, the Custom Union, the 
countries involved not only remove all tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions in their 
trade relations, but also set common tariffs and quantitative restrictions in their trade with 
a third country. Economic integration deepens with the next step that involves removing 
non-tariff barriers in trade and ensuring the freedoms of goods, services, capital and 
labor. Economic Union is the next higher step of economic integration where 
governments tightly coordinate and even unify their monetary and fiscal policies. 
Political unification is the latest stage of economic integration where economic policy 
making is completely unified and centralized. 
                                                 
5 Pelkmans (1983) provided a strong critique of these theories in explaining the patterns of evolution of 
market integration. He criticized them for not leaving enough room for the politics and the problems of 
collective action.  
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The European states have taken steps toward the progressive integration of their 
fragmented national markets though major policy initiatives starting in the early 1950s. 
There have been four major policy initiatives or programs, through which the 
construction of a European market has proceeded. These initiatives have defined the 
content of specific EU regulatory policies. My goal is not to reiterate what others have 
provided as detailed accounts of these initiatives (Wallace, Wallace & Pollack, 2005), but 
to give a sense of how these initiatives contributed to the realization of the overarching 
objective of European integration. 
Customs Union 
The founding treaties of European Integration, the Treaty of Paris in 1951 and the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957, provided a broad policy framework and set major objectives for 
European integration, the subsequent treaties provided revisions and further policy and 
institutional tools to realize what the founding treaties had set out. The most immediate 
goal set out by the Founding Treaties was the customs union. The most visible barriers 
that fragmented the European market were tariffs and quantitative restrictions behind the 
movements of goods. European states, depending on their political and economic 
objectives and sensitivities, imposed different levels of tariffs and quotas that limit 
movements of goods across their borders. The establishment of the customs union was 
associated with three more specific targets. The first was to remove tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions behind the movements of goods among the countries involved. 
The second was to introduce a common customs tariff (CCT), applicable throughout the 
European Community to third country goods. The third is to pursue a common 
commercial policy with respect to third parties as an external dimension of the customs 
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union. These objectives were achieved by 1968, and thus a full custom union was 
established among the member states. With the customs union, the EC countries made a 
significant progress in integrating their markets for goods. 
Single Market 
While the customs union largely integrated the market for goods by 1968, the then EC 
was far from realizing what the Founding Treaties laid out as the objective of establishing 
a common or single market with its defining four freedoms of goods, service, labor and 
capital. Discriminatory and restrictive practices still continued to keep the European 
market fragmented. Spurred by the declining competitiveness of the European economies 
in the face of the rising competition from the US and Japan in the 1980s, the EC launched 
the 1992 Project of completing the single market in the mid-1980s (Sandholz & Zysman, 
1989). This project came to be the defining moment of European integration. The goal of 
this program was to deepen the integration process. The project was formally declared in 
the Single European Act in 1986, which also set out the necessary institutional changes to 
make the enactment of legislation necessary for completing the single market. 
However, although the establishment of the custom union represented a 
significant progress in achieving integration in goods markets with the removal of tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions, there were still non-tariff barriers with their discriminatory 
and restrictive impacts on the movement of goods. Also, there was the persistent 
fragmentation in the service, labor and capital markets, likewise the result of various 
restrictive practices maintained by the member states for the protection of public goods or 
special interests. The 1992 project identified three major obstacles for the realization of 
the four freedoms: physical, technical and legal. 
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Physical barriers refer to administrative procedures and general border formalities 
that affect the easiness with which goods and peoples move across borders. With a 
number of formalities, there are delays, and transport and handling charges, which all add 
to costs and damage competitiveness (Wise & Gibb, 1993: 70). Custom procedures are 
unnecessarily long partly due to the fact that borders are where products and people get 
their first access to the national market. What this means is that a number of 
administrative procedures and formalities are designed to make necessary adjustments 
and to check whether products and people meet the requirements necessary for accessing 
to the national market. Borders are the points where standards and regulations permitting 
access to the national market are enforced. Some of these adjustments and controls 
involve checking the Value Added Taxes (VAT) being applied according to the principle 
of destination, which requires tax adjustment at the borders.  In order to eliminate or 
minimize distortions in the free flow of products and factors, and administrative costs 
associating with establishing and maintaining borders and border controls, the Single 
Market project sought to abolish or at least dramatically simplify border controls. This 
was achieved through coordinating policies and approximating legislation. 
Fiscal Barriers involve the diverse patterns of taxations applied across the 
member states. Wide differences in the rate, coverage and structure of direct and indirect 
taxes reinforce the segmented state of the European economy (Wise & Gibb, 1993, 86). 
Differences in indirect taxes, (Value Added Taxes (VAT), and Excise Duties), which are 
charged on the basis on the consumptions of products, create distortions in the free 
movements of goods and services. The differences in direct taxes (Corporate and Income 
taxes), which are charged on factors of production (capital and labor), cause distortions in 
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the free flow of capital and labor. Taxation systems of various types are maintained partly 
due to gain an advantage in attracting products and factors. The result is, factors might 
end up where taxes are more favorable rather than whey they would ideally get the 
highest return. 
While the physical and fiscal barriers to the free flow of products and factors are 
easy to figure out, the technical barriers are highly complicated. The category of technical 
barriers covers any other barrier other than the physical and fiscal ones. Standards and 
regulations that control access of products and factors to a national market could be 
instituted for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, these regulations address health, safety, 
environmental protection concerns. But, sometimes, they can be deliberately used to limit 
access by giving an advantage to home products and factors over foreign ones. These 
regulations take many forms, like testing, certification, national standards and diplomas. 
The distortion effects of technical barriers on the flow of products and factors 
were huge (Dierx Ilkovitz & Sekkat, 2004). Most of the Single market policies were 
designed to eliminate these distortion effects through either harmonization and 
approximation of regulations and standards or through mutual recognitions of distinct 
national practices by all governments. Removing national standards does not mean that 
the EU has no standards. Up to the Single Market Project, the prevalent strategy had been 
harmonization of these standards. However, the application of this strategy had not 
yielded much progress in removing these barriers. After the landmark decision by the 
ECJ in 1979, the EC discovered the power of the strategy of mutual recognition in 
pushing the Single market project (Alter, 1994). The mechanism of mutual recognition 
does not entail harmonizing diverse national standards, but nullifies the restrictive and 
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discriminatory effects of these standards by making diverse national standards applicable 
as long as they meet more specific health, safety and environmental standards. 
With the removal of non-tariff barriers, the Europeans aimed to achieve a new and 
dynamic market capable of competing with big rival markets, like the US and Japan. The 
Single market project was highly successful in removing various barriers erected to 
protect the national products and factors (Dierx Ilkovitz & Sekkat, 2004). The creation of 
a single market enhanced allocative efficiency through the mechanism of competition. 
Although the removal of barriers for the integration of product and factor markets 
strengthened the market forces and wealth creation mechanisms, the Single market 
project also addressed adjustment costs and risks associated with the restructuring and 
adjustment pressures of the single market. The functional, geographical and 
environmental impacts of the single market were respectively addressed by the regional, 
social and environmental policies. These policies had already entered into the policy 
agenda of the EC, but with the huge jump forward in economic integration that the Single 
Market project represents, the need to pay more attention to issues and adjustment costs 
became more acute. 
Economic and Monetary Union 
The creation of a single, expanded market of European size inevitably forced the member 
states to coordinate their macroeconomic policies. There were two major rationales for 
Economic and Monetary Union. First of all, European economic integration consists of 
integration of previously mixed economies marked by various form and levels of 
government involvement in economic life (Molle, 1990). Integrating mixed economies 
inexorably involves a spill-over into the policy realm and requires either coordination or 
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unification of economic policies. Secondly, with the emergence of an integrated 
economy, there was a growing concern about the ability of this market to respond to 
internal and external shocks, and the stabilization of the single market in the face of these 
shocks (Dyson, 1999). Just like in any other market economy, there was a need to employ 
common policies that could stabilize the European market in cases of shocks or crisis. 
That is why many consider theat Economic and Monetary union is a logical extension of 
the single market project. 
The member states had long maintained a close cooperation in monetary affairs 
dating back to the early 1970s and the Werner Report. Although the mechanisms, like the 
Snake system and later the European Monetary System, were enough in providing a tool 
to adjust to external and internal shocks in a custom union, the completion of the single 
market necessitated establishing a more advanced cooperation or unification than what 
was embodied in the European Monetary System. Proposed in 1989 in a highly 
influential White Paper by the European Commission, the monetary union found a formal 
expression in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Through three stages, the member states 
achieved monetary unification where national currencies are irrevocably fixed and the 
European Central Bank was established to determine common monetary policies. 
The unification in the realm of monetary policies was followed by a deepening 
cooperation in the other macro economic policies and fiscal policies, which found 
concrete expressions in the Maastricht Convergence criteria. Those criteria involve 
setting ranges of fluctuation in macro economic indicators, like inflation, government 
dept, government deficits and exchange rate. Those criteria were first set for the smooth 
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transition to the monetary union, but later formulated as a more general and stable 
framework in the form of Growth and Stability pact in 1997. 
Lisbon Strategy 
A large European market was firmly in place by the early 2000s with remarkable 
progress in establishing the single market and the economic and monetary Union. 
However, building a market economy is rarely a finished project, but it entails continuous 
adjustments and modifications. There are always new challenges that need to be assessed 
and dealt with. The EU fully realized this in the early 2000s when the European market 
performed relatively poorly compared with the American and Japanese markets. The EU 
institutions and member states conceived that the European market needed to be 
rejuvenated with a renewed emphasis on the principles of market economy, and a full and 
rigorous enforcement of the existing policies. 
While the Customs Union, the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary 
Union could be framed as different stages of economic integration, the policy program 
known as the Lisbon Strategy that was launched in the early 2000s was not a stage in the 
integration process. It represented an important moment in the realization of the objective 
of constructing a European market. The main purpose of the initiatives embodied in the 
Lisbon Strategy was to deal with the low productivity and stagnation of the European 
market compared with its competitors. The Lisbon Strategy was in a sense an interim 
assessment of how well the European Market does in terms of fully realizing its potential 
for growth and employment. The member states did a major overview of the single 
market project and the Economic and Monetary Union with a renewed commitment to 
the objectives of the previous policy programs. For example, while significant progresses 
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had been made in integrating the goods markets, the integration in service, capital and 
labor markets was still lagging. The Lisbon Strategy pointed out the shortcomings in the 
European market, incompleteness of integration in service sectors especially in network 
industries like telecommunication and energy. The Strategy formulated a set of proposals 
for the completion of integration in service and labor sectors and the further enforcement 
of the principles of the market economy to fully realize the potential of the European 
market for growth, employment and stability. These proposals were adopted in 2000, and 
to be attained by 2010. Its professed purpose is to make the European Market the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 
Along with showing how the European market can enhance its potential to create 
wealth, the Lisbon Strategy highlighted the need to address the welfare effects of the 
European market. It established a direct connection between the wealth creation capacity 
of the European market and the need to address welfare issues in the market. This 
connection constituted the substance of the principle of sustainability. Social inclusion 
and environmental protection were seen as necessary to sustain the ability of the 
European market to create wealth and prosperity. 
Based on the preceding examination of the substantive policy objective, building 
a Europeanwide market, that permeates EU rules and regulations, it is possible to 
operationalize the second hypotheses of the partisan approach. Here are the latest forms 
of the hypotheses of the partisan approach: 
The Process Hypothesis: 
The governments with more support for European integration tend to comply with EU 
rules and regulations better than the governments with less support. 
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The Substance Hypothesis: 
The governments whose partisan preferences are congruent with the objective of market 
building are expected to better in compliance with EU rules and regulations. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 3.1 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables. Table 3.2 presents the estimates 
for compliance across all policy areas. The results support the assertion that the partisan 
preferences of the governments of the member states concerning both the process and 
substantive outcome of EU rule making matter in their compliance with EU rules. The 
coefficient for the pro-Europeanness variable, which permits a test of the process 
hypothesis, is significant and negative as the partisan framework expects. The likelihood 
that the national governments with a more favorable preference for the European mode of 
governance have severe compliance problems is significantly less than that for the 
governments with a less favorable stance. The coefficient for the market economy 
variable, which represents the substance hypothesis, is also significant and negative. The 
governments with more support for the substantive policy outcome of general EU rules 
tend to do better in complying with these rules than the governments otherwise. 
To provide clarity into the impact of the pro-Europeanness and market economy 
variables on the severity of compliance problems, I calculated the predicted probabilities 
of being referred to the Court of Justice on the basis of given values on these independent 
variables. Predicting reference to the Court might be of interest for the students and 
practitioners of EU compliance. It represents a relatively high-profile turn in the sequence 
of actions in the infringement procedure. In the earlier stages of letter of formal notice 
and reasoned opinion, the Commission investigates the possible violation of EU rules 
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through informal or formal actions of relatively low profile. But, invoking the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ means that the Commission comes to be convinced of a substantive violation 
of EU rules and regulations and feels it necessary to take a relatively higher profile action 
of referring the case to the ECJ.  
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables # of Observation Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Infringement 10419 1.71 0.72 1.00 3.00 
Pro-Europeannes 10419 0.91 0.14 0.38 1.00 
Market Economy 10419 4.99 4.28 0.00 22.34 
Weighted Vote Powers 10419 6.36 2.93 2.00 10.00 
Intra-EU Trade 10419 47.77 29.47 16.80 121.40 
GDP Per Capita 10419 23.99 6.51 12.98 49.23 
Total Government Revenue 10419 40.33 5.38 29.94 54.02 
Membership Age 10419 31.79 17.26 2.00 53.00 
Judicial Review 10419 2.35 0.89 1.00 4.00 
Decentralization 10419 2.47 1.40 1.00 5.00 
Bicameralism 10419 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Corporatism 10419 0.91 1.07 0.00 3.00 
Coalition 10419 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Southern European Countries 10419 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Budget Contribution 10419 7.69 7.92 0.20 30.00 
Time Counter 10419 5.74 2.54 1.00 10.00 
Total Population 10419 29.15 26.76 0.41 82.50 
Life Satisfaction 10419 20.32 13.33 3.00 67.00 
Distrust in National Government 10419 48.99 10.20 20.00 80.00 
Support for a more Speedy Integration 10419 0.89 0.76 -0.60 2.50 
Preliminary Ruling 10419 17.93 17.77 0.00 70.00 
 
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 present the predicted probabilities of being referred to the 
Court of Justice as a function of the pro-Europeanness score and the support for market 
economy score respectively. As Figure 3.1 shows, a government with the minimum score 
on Pro-Europeaness (0.38) is two times more likely to be referred to the ECJ than a 
government with the maximum score of 1. As Figure 3.2 demonstrates, the governments 
with a score of 1, signifying disfavor for the principles of market economy variable, are 
three times more likely to be referred to the Court than the governments with a score of 
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support for market economy at 20, signifying a high level of support for the principles of 
market economy. These results illustrate that the probabilities that member states are 
referred to the Court of Justice in the compliance process decline as the partisan 
preferences of their governments become more favorable toward the process of EU rule 
making and the substance of rules being produced through this process.  
Table 3.2 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems 
  Coefficient   Robust Std Error 
Explanatory Variables      
Pro-Europeannes -1.13 *** 0.215 
Market Economy -0.08 *** 0.013 
Control Variables     
Weighted Vote Powers -0.25 *** 0.096 
Intra-EU Trade -0.01 *** 0.003 
GDP Per Capita 0.09 *** 0.010 
Total Government Revenue 0.07 *** 0.012 
Membership Age 0.00  0.005 
Judicial Review 0.25 *** 0.053 
Decentralization -0.17 *** 0.051 
Bicameralism  -1.73 *** 0.187 
Corporatism -0.03  0.111 
Coalition -0.40 *** 0.107 
Southern European Countries 1.36 *** 0.224 
Budget Contribution 0.16 *** 0.025 
Time Counter -0.03 *** 0.010 
Total Population -0.04 *** 0.012 
Life Satisfaction -0.04 *** 0.005 
Distrust in National Government -0.01 * 0.004 
Support for a more Speedy Integration -0.01  0.065 
Preliminary Ruling -0.01 ** 0.002 
      
Threshold 1 -0.72  0.519 
Threshold 2 1.29  0.519 
N 10419 
Wald chi2(20) 696.650 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.042 
Log pseudo-likelihood -9988.353 














































Figure 3.1 Pro-Europeanness and the Predicted Probability of Being Referred to the 
Court of Justice 
 
Regarding the effects of the control variables of the empirical model, there are 
both confirmatory and puzzling findings. First of all, the critics of the infringement data 
find support for their assertion that caution needs to be exercised in using these data 
because of the biases built into them. The Commission appears to be treating the southern 
European countries differently than the other member states. Also, in the member states 
where the publics have higher overall life satisfaction, the public seems to be more 
complacent about possible infringements. Moreover, the coefficient for the preliminary 
ruling is negative and significant, which suggests that some of potential infringement 
cases are solved even before they come before the Commission. Given the statistical 
significance of some of the biases in the infringement data, having them controlled in the 
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Figure 3.2 Support for Market Economy and the Predicted Probability of Being Referred 
to the Court of Justice 
 
The coefficient for the weighted vote variable is negative and highly significant. 
If governments are likely to gain policy battles at the EU level, they tend to have less 
severe problems in compliance with the resulting rules. One substantial implication of 
this finding concerns the IR literature on institutional design (Koremenos, Lipson & 
Snidal, 2001). Scholars have studied how institutional design matters in rule compliance 
(Mitchell; 1994; Fearon, 1998). My analysis shows that the regimes which reduce the 
veto power of individual states in order to enhance the efficiency of the rule making 
process are likely to have more compliance problems than the regimes which ensure that 
individual states are able to affect rule making according to their ideal policy positions. 
This further implies that there may be a substantial tension between the efficiency of the 
rule making process and the prospects of compliance with the resulting rules.  
 80
Also, that the coefficient for intra-EU trade is negative and highly significant 
suggests that the states that are more dependent on international rules are less likely to 
have severe compliance problems. This finding suggests that even mere dependence on 
international regimes for the attainment of desired policy goals can put pressure strong 
enough to force states to comply with the rules and regulations of these regimes. The 
finding confirms the existing literature that rule enforcement in international regimes 
does not have to be a mirror image of rule enforcement at the domestic level in that 
international enforcement is likely to occur through more indirect and subtle ways 
(Simmons, 2001a). 
The findings for the socialization variable and the material capacity variables 
come as a surprise in that they are not consistent with the established literature. The 
coefficient for the membership age is positive, but not significant. It appears that 
compliance does not improve with an increase in the length of membership, which further 
hints that it is not driven by the learning process. The coefficients for the GDP Per Capita 
and Total Government Revenue variables are positive and highly significant. This finding 
goes against the expectation of the established literature that states with material and 
human resources at their disposal are likely to have few compliance issues. Taken along 
with the result for the Weighted Votes variable, though, one might interpret this finding 
as suggesting that compliance is more about choice than capacity. 
Also interesting are the results for other domestic institutional and political 
variables. With the exception the judicial review variable, the coefficients for 
Bicameralism, Decentralization and Coalition variables are either not significant or 
significant in opposite directions. One interpretation of this general finding might be that 
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since compliance could be a highly legalistic matter, the characteristics of the legal 
system of a member outweigh other institutional features. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have examined compliance patterns of member states across all policy 
areas. The analysis entailed a more specific operationalization of the second, substance 
hypothesis of the partisan approach. I elaborated the overarching objective that informs 
EU regulatory policies and determines the general substance of specific EU regulatory 
policies. I claimed that European integration and its specific policies are driven by the 
objective of building a European market. After providing a better operationalization of 
the second hypothesis, I tested the hypotheses of the partisan approach to compliance. 
The findings of the empirical analysis provide a firm support for the partisan approach 
that party preferences of national governments have a systematic effect on the patterns of 
compliance of the member states. 
As a further test of robustness of the finding that the partisan preferences of 
national governments determine their compliance with EU rules, in the following two 
chapters, examine the patterns of compliance across different types of policies. While all 
regulatory policies of the EU share the same fundamental objective of constructing a 
Europeanwide market, they differ as to how regulatory they are. There are two major 
types of regulatory policies. The first type, which is the subject of the Chapter 4, is the 
de-regulatory policies. Constituting the centerpieces of European integration, these 
policies aim at abolishing or easing regulatory barriers in the emerging European market. 
The second type is re-regulatory policies. These policies are not concerned with welfare 
effects for different functional and geographical groups. These policies mostly 
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complement the national regulatory policies by addressing the welfare issues associated 
with establishing the European market. Analyses of compliance in these policy domains 





























This chapter carries out a robustness test of the partisan approach to international 
compliance by exploring how the partisan model performs in accounting for compliance 
in a particular sub category of EU policies, de-regulatory policies. The de-regulatory 
policies of the EU could be characterized as wealth-enhancing policies. These policies 
are concerned with empowering free market forces so that they can fully take advantages 
of the wealth creation capacities of a unified and enlarged market. Thus, the productive 
and allocative efficiencies of the single market can be fully realized. Major policies that 
are the milestones for the completion of the single market project have a de-regulatory 
impact. The fundamental idea underlying de-regulatory policies is to reduce the 
regulatory burden on market forces by either fully abolishing them or, as is primarily the 
case, streamlining diverse national regulatory practices and creating a simplified 
regulatory environment in the European market. 
The EU has employed three principal mechanisms, through which de-regulatory 
policies reduce the regulatory burden over market forces in the European market: the 
mechanisms of liberalization, harmonization and mutual recognition (Pelkmans, 2003). 
The mechanism of liberalization works through an almost complete removal of all 
discriminatory national practices and regulatory tools. This mechanism has been used in 
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de-regulatory attempts in sectors like telecommunication. The mechanism of 
harmonization seeks to ease the regulatory burden by doing away with diverse national 
regulatory policies of discriminatory and distorting effect by forcing the member states to 
approximate their regulatory practices on the basis of standards set at the European level. 
This mechanism has been operative especially before the early 1980s. However, since 
diverse national practices often have deep political and institutional roots, it proved rather 
hard to force member states to change their diverse national practices according to 
common European standards. 
The last mechanism, but probably the most prominent and innovative one, is the 
mechanism of mutual recognition. Thanks to the landmark decision by the European 
Court of Justice in 1979, the EC/U discovered an innovative tool of mutual recognition 
and realized that in order to neutralize the discriminatory effects of different national 
practices, they do not have to be completely removed or approximated according to 
common standards. The same effect can be achieved through the mutual acceptance of 
practices and rules of member states. The mechanism of mutual recognitions has 
spawned a surge in de-regulatory policies (Alter, 1994). 
Relying on the mechanisms of liberalization, harmonization and mutual 
recognition, EU de-regulatory policies do away with or neutralize the discriminatory and 
distorting effects of national regulatory practices. From the partisan politics framework, 
compliance with this type of policy requires a specific partisan preference especially in 
terms of the substance of de-regulatory policies. Like in Chapter 3, the process 
hypothesis is relatively straightforward, but the substance hypothesis needs to be 
reformulated more specifically. The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss some 
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examples of EU de-regulatory policies to illustrate the substantive logic of EU de-
regulatory policies to help a better operationalization of the substance hypothesis of the 
partisan framework. After operationally redefining the substance and process hypotheses, 
I empirically test them. The chapter ends with a brief summary of the results. 
EXEMPLARY DE-REGULATORY POLICIES 
De-regulatory policies occupy the center stage of the EU policy space. The major policy 
initiative, the Single Market project, had strongly de-regulatory impacts by removing or 
neutralizing discriminatory and restrictive practices that segment the European market 
(Wise and Gibbs, 1993). Their main objective is to create a regulatory environment 
within an integrated and enlarged market that empowers market forces through the 
promotion of competition, entrepreneurship and innovation. EU de-regulatory policies 
have been highly interconnected in their evolutions and actually reinforced each other. 
Competition Policy 
If there is a policy area where the principles of free market find the most discernible 
expression in the European policy space, it is definitely competition policy (Wilks, 2005). 
Although some scholars have claimed that competition policy could be classified as a re-
regulatory policy given the fact that competition policy often entails positive actions by 
the European Commission, competition policy fits the category of de-regulatory policy. 
First of all, its aim is to simplify the regulatory environment for competition by creating a 
single framework, and thus reduce the general regulatory burden, which stems from the 
diversity of standards and conditions. Secondly, the assertiveness of the Commission in 
enforcing it may make it appear a re-regulatory policy or positive policy, its purpose is to 
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set and rigorously enforce “standards of conduct rather than obtain tangible goals” 
(Wilks, 2005). 
The founding Treaties granted great significance to competition policy by 
stipulating that the European market ought to be based on free competition (Smith, 2005). 
The salience of this policy grew exponentially with the announcement of the Single 
Market Project in the mid-1980s. With the removal of visible barriers to the movements 
of products and factors, private and public actors may look for other ways to affect 
competition in the market to their advantages. Competition policy aims at creating 
conditions for free competition for market players. Its ultimate goal is to increase the 
efficiency in the allocation of factors and products. 
In the emerging European market, there are a number of practices by private and 
public actors that distort free competition and thus the efficient allocation of factors and 
products. While there are five areas that competition policy targets at: restrictive 
practices, abuse of dominance, merger control, state-aid, and the liberalization of utilities 
(Wilks, 2005). While the first three are practiced by private actors, the last two relate to 
the actions of the public authority. 
Anti-Trust: Restrictive Practices: 
EU competition policies prohibit agreements or any kind of collaboration between firms 
that are intended to create discrimination and biases in favor of specific economic actors 
and thus limit competition in the market. According to Article 81, TEC, (ex Article 85 
EEC), the Commission is stipulated to take actions in case where firms obstruct 
competition. What constitutes a restrictive behavior is not clearly defined, but there are 
some common practices that would be immediately labeled as restrictive. These are 
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concerted actions by private firms that ensure resale price maintenance, horizontal price 
fixing, export bans, and market sharing (Wilks, 2005). The Commission is granted with 
power to investigate and take actions to stop any kind of restrictive practices. 
Anti-trust: Abuse of Dominance: 
Article 82, TEC (ex Art. 86 EEC) prohibits ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the common market’. This rule targets a firm or a group of 
firms that constitute a monopoly or oligopoly. This is where the fundamental tradeoff 
between the allocative and productive efficiencies in European integration gets revealed 
(Dierx, Fabrienne, & Sekkat, 2004). Monopolies or oligopolies enjoy economies of scale, 
and are better able to fund large scale research and development projects. These features 
enhance productive efficiencies or production at lower costs per unit. However, 
monopolies and oligopolies set barriers to the entrance of new and possibly more 
efficient market forces. In that respect, monopolies and oligopolies hurt allocative 
efficiencies of the market, which entail the movement of market forces to where they 
would get the highest return.  Partly because of this tradeoff, the commission has 
remained ambivalent in scrutinizing this practice. But most the time, the Commission 
tends to prefer allocative efficiency over productive efficiency and closely watches 
monopolistic and oligopolistic practices (Smith, 2005). 
Merger Control: 
While EU competition policies regulate the existing structure of industry to correct any 
kind of concentration that could potentially or actually distort free competition in the 
European market, these policies also are preemptive. They are so in the sense that they 
provide a close scrutiny over merger and acquisition practices that could potentially 
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create monopolies. Using the authority granted with the Treaty of Rome and the Merger 
Regulations, Regulation No. 4064/89 amended by Regulation 1310/97, the Commission 
carefully watches mergers and acquisitions, the total value of which exceeds a specific 
threshold. As a follow-up to these regulations, the Commission formed a merger special 
task force, which examines all merger and acquisition cases through two stages. In the 
first stage, all mergers and acquisitions are examined; the second stage involves a close 
scrutiny of only those which have a strong prospect of generating a monopolistic position 
(Wilks, 2005). If the Commission is convinced that a prospect merger or acquisition is 
likely to create monopolies, it could take a range of actions, including referring the case 
to the European Court of Justice. 
State Aids (Subsidies): 
The free competition in the emerging European market is likely to be distorted not just by 
the practices of private actors, but also the actions of public authorities. EU Competition 
policies target those practices by member states that create discriminations and 
distortions in favor of industries or firms that are perceived as nationally important.  
Articles 87 and 88 TEC (ex Arts. 92 and 93 EEC) state that aids to business, private or 
state-owned, which distort competition, are incompatible with the common market. State 
aids cover all kind of actions, including tax breaks, preferential purchasing, loans, and 
even loan guarantees (Wilks, 2005). Usually, the main beneficiaries of these aids are a 
firm and category of firms. Not all aids are prohibited. Some aids are part of a broader 
industrial policy that the member states had followed until the late 1980s. They have been 
used to sustain some industries, like shipbuilding, coal, steel, aerospace and the motor 
industry. They can also be used to support small enterprises, backward regions and R&D. 
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EU competition rules ask member states to inform the Commission about all kinds of aids 
or subsidies that they provide. First, the Commission emphasizes transparency as well as 
reduction or minimizing these aids. State aids are still rather prevalent, yet the 
competition policies require member states to minimize them so that movements of 
market forces are least hampered by interventions of public authorities. 
The Liberalization of Public Utilities: 
Another area that EU competition policies address is public unities that are largely or 
partially controlled by the national governments. Competition policies promote the 
liberalization of domestic utilities and network industries (Arts 31 and 86 TEC; ex Arts. 
37 and 85 EEC). For a number of reasons, the national governments nationalize or grant a 
monopoly position to state or private utilities or operate regulatory frameworks that 
distort competition (Wilks, 2005). Conventionally, these industries are telecoms, energy, 
water, post, transport and airlines, insurance and the media. EU has policies related to 
each of these industries, which I will discuss in the following section. Actually, the EU-
led push for liberalization in these industries was first spurred from the operation of 
competition policy (Smith, 2005). The Competition policy provided a potent impetus for 
opening up these industries to competitive market force by providing a legal foundation 
to launch assaults over state-owned or supported monopolies. 
Industrial, Enterprise, and Research and Development Policies 
The policies collected under this section all aim at enhancing the efficiency and 
competitiveness of European industries. However, unlike the traditional industrial 
policies, these policies improve competitiveness by fostering entrepreneurship and 
innovation (Dinan, 2005). These policies often replace diverse national practices and 
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provide a simplified and joint framework. The EU realized that creating a business 
environment that stimulates competitiveness, entrepreneurship and innovation is the best 
industrial policy. Like competition policy, these policies are strongly concerned with 
enhancing the wealth creation capacity of the European market. 
Industrial Policy: 
Despite the interventionist nature of EU industrial policies, these policies are driven by 
the objective of promoting a regulatory environment conducive for industrial growth. In 
contrast to the member states’ traditional industrial policies, which are overtly 
interventionist and protectionist, EU industrial policies provide a single scheme to help 
ailing industries of the member states so that there is no distortion associating with 
different forms and degrees of interventions embodied in national practices. These 
policies are not designed to eliminate all industrial policies, but reduce the regulatory 
burden and discriminations that come with existence of the national practices. The main 
goal is to help the European industries to be more competitive in relation with their 
American and Japanese counterparts by creating an environment that is business friendly. 
In the 1970s, with a spur from the member states, the EC provided various kind of 
assistance to national industries with problems. This assistance grew in volume and kind 
in the 1980s. EU industrial policies shifted their attention from old industries like steel, 
textile and shipbuilding, to new high-technology industries. The national governments 
had taken various steps to boost their high-technology sectors and collaborated in their 
efforts. As the individual and collective efforts to bridge technology gap that divided the 
European industries from their American and Japanese counterparts, the EC was called 
into action. 
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The thrust of EU industrial policies in the 1980s was to end the fragmentation of 
Europe’s own market by eliminating tariffs and non tariff barriers. Big businesses 
supported the EC’s initiative to liberalize, harmonize and standardize. Far from 
displaying the kind of interventionism that has characterized national industrial policies, 
the EU industrial policies help “level the playing field for manufacturers throughout the 
EC” (Dinan, 2005, 428).  The Single market project became the centerpiece of the EU’s 
industrial strategy in the late 1980s by promoting economies of scale and efficient 
allocations of the factors. 
The policy orientation underlying industrial policies in the 1990s was a rejection 
of the old style interventionist and protectionist approach and the embrace of the idea that 
“the role of government should be limited to providing, first, a competitive business 
climate and, second, catalysts to encourage firms to adjust rapidly to changing 
circumstances.” (Dinan, 2005: 429). 
The relatively less interventionist character of EU industrial policies and 
strategies sets them apart from their national counterparts. Promoting competitiveness 
and innovation is the main motivation of EU industrial policies, which came to be much 
more pronounced after the Single market project and throughout the 1990s. Due to the 
emphasis of promoting competitiveness of the European market, industrial policies have 
been strongly tied to competition policies. EU industrial policies are not industry specific, 
but “horizontal” in that they provide a generalized context conducive for the 
competitiveness by creating and enforcing a level playing field for European 




EU enterprise policies have evolved as a part of EU industrial policies. In the context of 
the implementation of the Single market project, their prominence grew, and they 
attained some autonomy from industrial policies in that they specifically address the 
issues of promoting innovation and entrepreneurship in the European market by creating 
a business-friendly environment. This area has become highly prominent in the aftermath 
of the Lisbon Strategy, which sets increasing the competitiveness of the European market 
as a major policy goal. These policies target national actions or inactions that stifle 
entrepreneurship and innovation. These policies provide different strategies for different 
sectors. For the new sectors, the emphasis is on promoting researches and innovation to 
provide tools for market forces to prosper. For the old sectors, the emphasis is on 
expanding market accesses on a global scale. The Commission uses a variety of specific 
policy tools to encourage entrepreneurship and innovations, including education and 
training and providing various kinds of financial incentives for those who want to start a 
business (Dinan, 2005: 431). 
Research and Development (R&D) Policy: 
Research and Development (R&D) policies share the same thrust as industrial and 
enterprise policies, and are in fact so much interconnected with these policies that it is 
rather hard to draw boundaries between them. Like industrial and enterprise policies, 
R&D policies aim at promoting innovation and economic growth by providing resources 
to market forces. Like other policies, R&D policies are designed to provide a single 
framework, which provides collective tools to support R&D across the European market, 
where private and public actors can come together and collaborate in developing R&D. 
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EU involvement in R&D goes back to the early decades of integration, when a 
number of research centers to support R&D were instituted. However, the EC started 
being genuinely active in this area with the launching of the European Strategic Program 
for Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT) in the early 1980s. 
In the process leading to the Single market project and in its aftermath, R&D policies 
were formally integrated into the Treaty framework. R&D policies work either through 
the establishment of EU-run research centers or the funding of R&D projects undertaken 
by organizations from different member states. Internally, R&D policies attempt to 
eliminate disadvantages and inadequacies that associate with maintaining diverse national 
practices and initiatives, thus fragmentations having roots in the diversity of national 
practices in this. Externally, R&D policies enhance the competitiveness of European 
market forces in relations with their American and Japanese counterparts (Dinan, 2005). 
EU R&D policies may appear to be an interventionist policy. It was more so 
before that it is now. Overtime, R&D policies came to be more imbued with liberal 
ideals. R&D policies do not necessarily target at specific firms or industry, but provide an 
environment that stimulates companies and firms to do more investment in R&D. The 
goal is to enable market forces to take full advantages of the competitiveness and wealth 
creation potential of the European market. 
Network Policy 
The success of establishing a single market requires depends the construction of a reliable 
and efficient infrastructure. The EU’s involvement in the areas of network industries 
including transportation, telecommunication and energy has been geared by the goal of 
enhancing productive capacity of and the competitiveness of the emerging European 
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market. Member states have different policies and practices in these areas. Some member 
states have more regulations in these areas than others, which causes fragmentation and 
distortions in the movement of goods and people across the European market. The result 
is the higher transportation, telecommunication or energy costs for economic actors 
moving across the European market. These policies could be conceived de-regulatory in 
the sense that they force member states to reduce regulatory burden in these areas, and 
are driven by the efficiency concerns or enhancing the allocative efficiency by building a 
common infrastructure that the European market can rely on.  The goal is to promote 
competitiveness in these industries, so that the productive and competitiveness potentials 
of the single market can be fully be realized. Conventionally, these are areas where 
states’ involvement is conceived as “natural”, even in those countries with liberal market 
economy. 
Transportation Policy: 
The Treaty of Rome set the common transportation policy as an integral part of the 
objective of the Common Market. Article 80 of the Treaty clarified that the main goal of 
the policy was to prevent any kind of discriminations that the national transport rate and 
policies create in the common market. The policy covers all kinds of transportations, 
road, railroad, inland waterway, marine and aviation transport (Oudenaren, 2000). While 
the common transportation policy remained dormant before the 1980s, the Single market 
project brought to the transportation policy to the center of policy debates. From the 
1980s, the transportation policy not only forced the member states to open their 
transportation infrastructure to foreign competition and to liberalize their national railroad 
companies, but also provided the legal ground for the initiation and financing of major 
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projects to build a Europeanwide transportation system (Oudenaren, 2000). Also, the 
policy neutralized the discriminatory effects of diverse national practices related to 
transportation through wither harmonization or mutual recognition of diverse national 
standards. Essentially, the goal is to empower market forces by opening the transportation 
sector to competition and creating a reliable transportation network that is necessary for 
the free movements of products and factors. 
Energy Policy: 
The EU’s involvement was relatively late, certainly later than the transportation sector. 
Part of the reason was that this sector had long remained monopolized by the public 
authority. Conventionally, the state has been concerned about the security and 
uninterrupted supply of energy for economy. National governments’ monopoles had been 
regarded as natural. As integration deepened, the monopolistic structure of the energy 
sector looked increasingly anachronistic in the overall framework of the common market. 
Using its power in competition, the Commission challenged the national monopolies in 
the energy sector. The approach of the Commission shifted from one of caution not to 
upset the national government to one of a forceful push to liberalize the energy sector 
throughout the 1990s. The efforts of the Commission are driven by the goal of 
establishing a single market in the energy sector and thus allowing market forces to work 
with the lowest-cost EU provider rather than being stuck with their national monopolies 
(Dinan, 2005). Despite the resistance especially from the protectionist member states, like 
France, the EU has been able to push liberalization and de-regulation of the energy sector 




Like the energy and transportation sectors, the structure of the telecommunication sector 
was long characterized by national monopolies for the same reasons. Conceived 
necessary for the best interest of the public, the national governments’ monopoly in this 
sector was regarded as “natural” (Noam, 1992). However, as the EC/U was making 
progress toward completing the Single Market, it became clear that the European market 
cannot realize its wealth creation potential unless the telecommunication sectors of the 
member states were liberalized. Also stimulated by the global trend of de-regulation in 
the telecommunication sector, the EC took the first steps in liberalizing first the 
procurement and then infrastructure of the telecommunication sector (Humphreys, 2005). 
The 1987 White Paper by the Commission laid down a guideline for the liberalization of 
telecommunication sector and set 1998 for its completion. A series of legislation ensued 
the White paper, which addressed the issues like interconnection, interoperability, and 
licensing of telecommunications (Thatcher, 2001). Thus, the sources of abnormal 
differences across the member states in terms of rate and quality of telecommunication 
were abolished. 
By 1998, the objective of full liberalization of telecommunication sectors of the 
member states was largely achieved. But, the EU regulatory policies in this sector shifted 
to the next stage. At this stage, the main framework of which was laid down by another 
influential White Paper in 1997, the EU took a number of initiatives to streamline 
regulatory frameworks for telecommunication and information technologies by creating a 
single framework (Thatcher, 2001). The White Paper set 2003 as the deadline for the 
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completion of a simplified regulatory framework for telecommunication and information 
technologies. 
Based on the preceding examination of the substantive policy objective that 
permeates EU de-regulatory rules and regulations, it is possible to operationalize the 
second hypotheses of the partisan approach. Here are the more specifically defined forms 
of the hypotheses of the partisan approach: 
The Process Hypothesis: 
The governments with more support for European integration tend to comply with EU 
rules and regulations better than the governments with less support. 
The Substance Hypothesis: 
The governments whose partisan preferences are congruent with the objective of market 
building are expected to do better in compliance with EU rules and regulations. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The de-regulatory policies included in my data set are competition, enterprise, energy, 
transportation and telecommunication and information society. Table 4.1 gives a 
breakdown of infringements cases in the whole data set, according to policy types, 
member states and stages of infringement. Like in Chapter 3, I use the ordered logit 
statistical technique. Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the empirical model. 
Table 4.3 presents the models analyzing the determinants of compliance in de-
regulatory policy areas. That the coefficient for the pro-Europeanness variable is 
significant and in the same direction as hypothesized confirms the process hypothesis. 
The more pro-European governments do better in complying with de-regulatory policies 
 98
than the less pro-European governments. Like the process hypothesis, the substance 
hypothesis finds confirmation in the two models. The governments having stronger 
partisan biases in favor of free enterprise are less likely to have severe problems in 
complying with the de-regulatory policies than the governments with weaker biases. 
Table 4.1 Breakdown of Infringement Actions in De-Regulatory Policies from January 
1995 to May 2004 into Countries and the Stages of Infringement 
 
Country Stages of Infringement  Total 
  LFN RO RC   
Austria 121 128 41 290 
Belgium 168 246 59 473 
Denmark 117 17 8 142 
Finland 108 45 14 167 
France 138 252 163 553 
Germany 142 157 63 362 
Greece 181 195 68 444 
Ireland 116 109 64 289 
Italy 146 259 112 517 
Luxembourg 137 124 76 337 
Netherland 123 86 34 243 
Portugal 178 190 70 438 
Spain 108 136 48 292 
Sweden 123 39 15 177 
UK 125 97 36 258 
Total 2031 2080 871 4982 
 
In order to further illustrate the substantive meanings of the coefficients in the 
empirical model, I calculated the predicted probabilities that the governments of the 
member states as of April 30, 2004 would have been referred to the Court of Justice. 
Table 4.4 shows the ruling governments on April 30, 2004, their partisan compositions, 
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their pro-Europeanness and Free enterprise scores, and the predicted probabilities of 
being referred to the Court of Justice. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables # of Observation Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Infringement 4982 1.69 0.70 1.00 3.00 
Pro-Europeannes 4982 0.92 0.13 0.38 1.00 
Free Enterprise 4982 2.49 2.74 0.00 12.78 
Weighted Vote Powers 4982 6.34 2.90 2.00 10.00 
Intra-EU Trade 4982 48.57 30.01 16.80 121.40 
GDP Per Capita 4982 23.90 6.52 12.98 49.23 
Total Government Revenue 4982 40.35 5.19 29.94 54.02 
Membership Age 4982 32.34 17.25 2.00 53.00 
Judicial Review 4982 2.37 0.88 1.00 4.00 
Decentralization 4982 2.51 1.42 1.00 5.00 
Bicameralism  4982 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Corporatism 4982 0.91 1.06 0.00 3.00 
Coalition 4982 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Southern European Countries 4982 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Budget Contribution 4982 7.64 7.90 0.20 30.00 
Time Counter 4982 5.66 2.52 1.00 10.00 
Total Population 4982 28.80 26.62 0.41 82.50 
Life Satisfaction 4982 20.36 13.31 3.00 67.00 
Distrust in National Government 4982 49.07 10.48 20.00 80.00 
Support for a more Speedy Integration 4982 0.92 0.76 -0.60 2.50 
Preliminary Ruling 4982 18.09 17.83 0.00 70.00 
 
The differences in the predicted probabilities of being referred to the Court across 
the member states governments are most pronounced in the free enterprise score. For 
example, in the process of compliance with the de-regulatory policy model, the second 
Blair cabinet in UK and the third Persson cabinet in Sweden, which had respectively the 
scores of 0.12 and 0.39 in support for free enterprise, had two times greater probability of 
being referred to the Court than the second Schussel cabinet in Austria, which had the 
score of 12.78 in support for free enterprise. 
On the control variables part of the empirical model, the results are similar to the 
findings of the empirical model in Chapter 3. The coefficients for some of the variables 
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controlling for possible biases in the infringement data, like the preliminary ruling, 
southern European country and life satisfaction, are significant and in the expected 
directions. The finding confirms the necessity of caution that this study exercises in using 
these data. Like in the empirical model in Chapter 3, while the coefficients for the 
weighted voting power and Intra-EU trade variables are significant and in the 
hypothesized direction, the coeffieicnts for the variables controlling the managerial 
approach, GDP Per Capita and Total Government Revenues, are significant in the 
opposite direction to the hypothesized one. The same interpretation applies that the 
compliance patterns of the member states are driven by their will rather than their 
capacity.     
Overall, the empirical analyses provide a strong and consistent support for the 
process and substance hypotheses of the partisan approach. The governments with a more 
favorable stance toward the EU rule making mechanisms and the substantive outcomes of 
EU de-regulatory policies are less likely to have major problems with EU compliance.        
SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the compliance patterns of EU member states in de-regulatory 
policy areas. Having presented the specific goals and tools of these policies and thus 
provided a better operationalization of the second hypothesis of the partisan approach, I 
have tested how the partisan preferences of the governments of the member states affect 
their compliance with these policies. The empirical findings support the partisan 
approach. The governments that have a favorable stance toward the EU policy making 
process and the substantive policy outcome of de-regulatory policies tend to have less 
severe compliance peoples than the governments with a disfavorable stance.  The next 
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chapter will shift the focus to another category of policies known as re-regulatory policies 
and test the observable implications of the partisan approach in this policy area. 
Table 4.3 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems across De-Regulatory 
Policies 
 
  Coefficient   Robust Std Error 
Explanatory Variables      
Pro-Europeannes -0.642 * 0.359 
Free Enterprise -0.068 *** 0.023 
Market Regulation  -   - 
Control Variables     
Weighted Vote Powers -0.235 * 0.136 
Intra-EU Trade -0.007 * 0.004 
GDP Per Capita 0.072 *** 0.015 
Total Government Revenue 0.052 *** 0.015 
Membership Age 0.005  0.007 
Judicial Review 0.181 ** 0.075 
Decentralization -0.097  0.068 
Bicameralism  -1.525 *** 0.250 
Corporatism 0.098  0.148 
Coalition -0.004  0.154 
Southern European Countries 1.519 *** 0.314 
Budget Contribution 0.135 *** 0.037 
Time Counter -0.054 *** 0.014 
Total Population -0.028  0.019 
Life Satisfaction -0.044 *** 0.007 
Distrust in National Government -0.008  0.005 
Support for a more Speedy Integration 0.016  0.086 
Preliminary Ruling -0.016 *** 0.003 
      
Threshold 1 -0.184  0.827 
Threshold 2 1.954  0.827 
N 4904 
Wald chi2(20) 321.9 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0396 
Log pseudo-likelihood -4694.4777 








Table 4.4 National Governments as of 30 April 2004, Their Partisan Compositions and 
the Predicted Probabilities of Being Referred to the Court of Justice on the Basis of Their 
Preferences about the Process and Substance of the EU Policy Making 
 
Country Government Partisan Composition De-Regulatory Policy Areas 
      Pro-Europeanness Free Enterprise 









Australian People's Party 
(OVP): Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPO); 





Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats (Flemish 
Speaking) (VLD); 
Socialist Party (PS) 
(French Speaking); 
Reform Movement (MR), 
French Speaking; Social 
Progressive Alternativers 
(SPIRIT), Flemish 





Liberal Party (V); 
Conservative People's 





Centre Party (KESK); 
Social Demoratic Party 
(SDP); Swedish People's 





Union for the Presidential 
Majority (UMP); Union 
for the French Democracy 





Social Democrats (SDP); 





New Democracy Party 
0.99 0.09 2.88 0.07 
Ireland The Second Ahern Cabinet 
Fianna Fail (FF); 





FI; AN; LN;CCD-CDU; 
Independents 1.00 0.09 5.32 0.06 
Netherland The Second Balkenende 
Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA); People's 
Part for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD); 





Christian Social Party 
(CSV); Socialist Workers' 





Social Democratic Party 
(PSD); Democratic Social 
Centre/People's Party; 
Independents 0.83 0.10 1.95 0.08 






1.00 0.09 0.39 0.09 










The previous chapter undertook a robustness check of the partisan approach in one of the 
specific sub-categories of EU policies, de-regulatory policies. This chapter does one more 
robustness test in another type of policy area of practical and theoretical importance, re-
regulatory policies. While de-regulatory policies have occupied the central place in the 
EU policy space, re-regulatory policies have grown in quantity and saliency as 
integration has deepened. Re-regulatory policies are different from de-regulatory policies 
in terms of their substantive rationales as well as their relations to national regulatory 
policies. On the one hand, de-regulatory policies are concerned more with enhancing the 
wealth creation capacity of market forces by empowering them, and thus are driven by 
the substantial goal of increasing the productive and allocative efficiencies in the 
emerging European market. On the other hand, re-regulatory policies are motivated more 
by the specific welfare effects of the functioning of market forces in the emerging 
market. 
The construction of an integrated market has adjustment pressures that are felt in 
the form of adverse effect on the economic, social and ecological welfares of specific 
groups or general publics. Adjustment pressures are felt in at least three forms: 
functionally, geographically and ecologically. Functionally, factors that have thrived or at 
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least survived in a protectionist and restrictive economic environment provided by the 
public authority are likely to face the challenge of adjusting to a more competitive market 
environment. For example, reshuffling old market relations based on the old 
segmentation of national markets for the functional groups, especially workers, who find 
themselves left redundant in a more competitive market. Geographically, economic 
reshuffling associating with doing away old protectionist and restrictive practices 
involves the movements of business from one area to another with the expectation that 
economic return would be higher in the latter than the former. This usually means that 
some regions in an enlarged market possibly suffer from an industrial or economic 
decline. Ecologically, economic development and growth associated with the 
establishment of a single market are likely to raise ecological problems, like air and water 
pollution. 
EU regulatory policies are intended to ease adjustment pressures for functional 
groups, regions and ecological environment by attempting to rectify adverse welfare 
effects of economic integration and the associating economic restructuring and expansion 
of economic transactions. Although EU re-regulatory policies could certainly have the 
effect of enhancing market efficiencies (Wise and Gibbs, 1993; Majone, 1996), their 
primary goal is to address the regional, functional and ecological welfare effects of the 
creation and operation of the European market (Dinan, 2005). 
Re-regulatory policies are different from de-regulatory policies also in terms of 
their relation to national regulatory practices. The de-regulatory policies of the EU are 
aimed at reorganizing the EU regulatory environment to reduce regulatory burdens on 
market forces so that they can operate more freely in an environment with fewer 
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distortions and discriminations (Scharpf, 1999). They do so not necessarily by completely 
abolishing regulations, but primarily by streamlining diverse and discriminatory national 
regulatory practices into a simplified framework. However, re-regulatory policies do not 
entail abolishing or streamlining diverse national practices, but usually complement 
national regulatory practices and in fact make them much more efficient by addressing 
welfare issues that have roots in community practices. 
Like in the previous chapter, the process hypothesis is straightforward in that the 
governments with a favorable stance toward EU rule making process tend to do better in 
compliance with re-regulatory policies than the governments with less favorable stance. 
However, the second hypothesis needs to be better operationalized, which requires 
identifying the fundamental policy purpose shared by EU re-regulatory policies. I have 
already elaborated the fundamental logic of re-regulatory policies that is to address the 
adverse welfare effects of the emerging European market. In order to provide a better 
illustration of this purpose, I first discuss some exemplary re-regulatory policies, like 
social policies, regional policies and environmental policies. After reiterating the process 
and substance hypotheses in more specific terms, I empirically test them. The chapter 
will end with a summary.  
EXEMPLARY RE-REGULATORY POLICIES  
It is possible to put EU re-regulatory policies into three categories depending on the 
impacts felt by adjustment pressures generated by the establishment of a European 
market. The first category is social and employment policies that address adjustment 
pressures on functional groups, like labor and women. The second category is regional 
policies that are designed to make adjustment to a more competitive and dynamic 
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economic environment easier for regions, especially poor ones. The last, but definitely 
the least, category is environmental policies, which aim at easing adjustment pressures on 
ecological environment. The saliency of these policies has grown as European integration 
has deepened. 
Social and Employment Policy 
Integration and the competitive environment in the resulting larger market almost 
inevitably create adjustment pressures for functional groups, like workers, small business 
and ordinary citizens (Wise & Bibb, 1993). In fact, European integration is often 
criticized for benefiting mainly big businesses and creating disproportionate adjustment 
pressures for workers, small businesses and ordinary citizens (Van Oudenaren, 2000). 
Workers face the risk of being obsolete in a dynamic and competitive environment. In 
order to deal with this adjustment pressure, they either need to be trained or need to move 
to where they would get better economic return. Either of these options is not very 
feasible in practice. It is hard to imagine redundant workers taking the initiative and 
retrain themselves. Also given the fact that labor is much less immobile than capital due 
to cultural and linguistic issues, a geographical relocation of workers is rather difficult. 
Likewise, a competitive and dynamic market environment is likely to create adjustment 
pressures for small business which do not enjoy the economies of scale to the same extent 
that big business enjoy. Ordinary citizens or consumers could potentially feel adverse 
effects of market integration. It is feared that unbridled competition can lead to neglect of 
health and safety issues for consumers. Member states can use national regulatory 
mechanisms to gain more advantage in competition or resort to what is commonly known 
as social dumping. 
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Although the Treaty of Rome did not extensively mention social policies, it 
apparently recognized that integration can create adjustment pressures for functional 
groups that would run the risk of being obsolete. The Treaty established the European 
Social Fund to help workers who are dislocated as a result of changing market dynamics. 
The aid often took the form of retraining or relocating workers so that they can adjust to 
the new market conditions. The Treaty also had provisions that addressed sex 
discrimination at the work place. This provision was a response to the fear that diverse 
national practices in this area can pressure for social dumping which was supposed to 
lower the standards for women. Also, the Treaty had a few provisions that set the 
improvement of working and living conditions for workers as one of the objectives of 
integration. Despite the rudimentary legal basis for EU social policy, the major 
components of social policy, like social welfare, employment policy and health and 
safety matters remained with the jurisdiction of national governments throughout the 
1960s (Van Oudenaren, 2000). 
The 1970s started with a renewed interest in social policy, which was spurred by 
the completion of the Custom Union, the expectation of monetary union by the end of the 
decade and the impending first enlargement (Van Oudenaren, 2000). In the 1972 Paris 
Submit, the EC leaders agreed to a Social Action Plan in order to make the EC more 
active in improving working and living conditions, better dialogue among trade unions 
employers and government and workers’ participation in management decisions. EC 
social policies often remained under the shadow of economic policies and suffered from 
the same setbacks that afflicted other EU policies and European integration in general. 
Despite the slow progress in the 1970s, there was also some progress on workers’ 
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information and consultations rights and equal payment and treatment of women. The 
ambitious objectives of the Action Plan in the early 1970s remained unachieved in the 
economic and political difficulties in the rest of the decades. 
The launching of the Single Market Project in the mid-1980s drew attention to the 
area of social policy. One of the reasons for the relative inaction of the EC in the area of 
social policy before the 1980s was the scale of economic integration that had been 
achieved. Establishing the Customs Union did not create as much adjustment pressures 
for functional groups as the Single Market Project would. With a renewed attempt to 
deepen integration, embodied in the Single European Act in 1986, social policy moved 
from the periphery of the EC policy space to its center. Also the accession of Portugal, 
Spain and Greece with their relatively backward economic conditions raised further 
questions about adjustment pressures for functional groups in relatively backward 
economies. The saliency of social policy increased in the context of bargaining over the 
largely de-regulatory and business-friendly Single market project. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the chief policies of the single market project were de-regulatory and 
aimed at empowering free market forces. The leftist governments of the member states 
emphasized the need to take into account the welfare effects of the liberalization and de-
regulatory policies associated with the Single Market Project. They solemnly declared 
that the European integration project had a social dimension. Increasing EC activism in 
the realm of social policy was important in mobilizing the support of especially workers 
and creating a broad political basis for the Single Market project (Wise & Gibb, 1993). 
The rising interest in social policies and the need to address the adverse welfare 
effects of integration amounted to the declaration of a non-binding agreement called the 
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Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers in 1989. Briefly 
known as the Social Charter, this document laid down 47 areas for actions to establish 
and further strengthen the social dimension of the Single Market that was still 
rudimentary. These proposals for actions were later transformed into legislative proposals 
in the subsequent Social Action Program. Proposed legislation covered a number of 
social policy issues, like freedom of movement, right to have better working and living 
conditions, right to vocational training, right to social protection under prevailing national 
systems, right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. This charter was non-
binding and mostly symbolic due to British opposition. Margaret Thatcher and her 
successor, John Major, would never endorse the Social Charter. But, it would serve as the 
basis for EU activism in this area throughout the 1990s. 
The Social Charter served the basis for defining and enforcing the social 
dimension of the European Market for negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty. Due 
to the relentless British opposition, the Social Charter was incorporated into the Treaty 
system as a Protocol annexed to the Treaty. The EU was granted with authority to make 
legislation in the area of social policy that applies to all member states except Britain. 
This awkward situation of incoherence in the realm of social policy was later rectified 
with the Labor Party coming to power. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the Social Protocol 
was fully incorporated into the EU legal system. The Lisbon Strategy further reinforced 
the status of social policies by establishing an intrinsic connection between the need to 
ameliorate adjustment pressure on some functional groups, on the one hand, and the 
wealth creation capacity of the market, on the other, in the form of sustainability. 
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Since the late 1980s, the EU has made significant progress in establishing and 
solidifying the social dimension of the European integration project in order to address 
potential or actual welfare effects for functional groups, like labor, women, and 
consumers. Some of the major achievements in social policy since the mid-1980s are as 
follow. Efforts to make labor more mobile so that they can easily adjust to dynamic 
market environment have yielded some successes, like extension of right of residency to 
students, retirees, self-employers and the self-employed, even though there are still major 
issues in this area, like limitations in fully benefiting from social rights in any member 
states. The EU has a number of regulations to improve working conditions for women, 
like various directives on parental leaves, equal rights for temporary workers and 
working time, workers consultation in company decision-making. Social policies have 
come to cover various types of regulations on health and consumer protections (Dinan, 
2005). 
Social policies often complement more comprehensive national social policies, 
where the state takes on the responsibility of supplying social goods, such as social 
insurance, health care, welfare services, education and housing. Although some scholars 
have claimed that these policies are driven more by a concern with market efficiency than 
by a concern with justice and welfare (Majone, 1996), it is hard to explain these policies 
solely on the basis of their efficiency effects (Dinan, 2005). 
Regional Policy 
European integration has brought about adjustment pressures not only for functional 
groups but also for regions (Overturft, 1986). Integration creates incentives for market 
forces to move to where they would get their economic return. In an economic 
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environment where economic activities are not symmetrically distributed across different 
regions, the movements of products and factors are likely to lead the decline or 
concentration of economic activities in different regions. This is likely to create or further 
aggravate economic disparities among geographical regions. Conventionally, public 
authorities tend to address regional disparities by using redistributional tools, like 
protection for or subsidies for depressed and economically poorly performing regions. 
Integration is likely to aggravate existing regional disparities. Rich regions are likely to 
get richer, while poor regions tend to get poorer. From a purely economic standpoint, 
regional disparities are inevitable and are likely to be resolved in the long term. However, 
regional disparities and the disproportionate distribution of adjustment pressures across 
regions are likely to threaten the integrity of the single market and undermine the ideals 
of community and solidarity. Thus, the EC/U has developed policy tools to address 
regionally felt adjustment pressures in an integrated market economy. 
In the early years of integration, there was not much attention to the adverse 
effects on regional welfare of economic integration; the member states were taking care 
of these effects with their own resources (Von Oudenaren, 2000).  However, the issue 
grew in urgency in the wake of the first enlargement in 1973. The first enlargement 
involved the accession of new member states, like Ireland and Britain, with poorly 
performing regions. At the 1972 Paris Submit, the EC decided to establish a regional 
policy. The policy aimed at easing adjustment pressures for lagging regions by reducing 
regional disparities and providing funds to lagging regions so that they can adjust to a 
more competitive market environment. The EC employed a policy tool known as the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
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The Mediterranean enlargement in the 1980s, which brought Spain, Portugal and 
Greece into the Community, made regional disparities economically consequential and 
politically relevant. In an enlarged Europe, the concern for depressed regions became 
more urgent not just for the poor regions of the new member states, but also for the poor 
regions of existing and wealthier member states, like Germany. The new member states, 
like Spain, spearheaded in pushing the regional policy into the EC policy agenda. 
Regional policies gained prominence with the increasing integration associated 
with the Single market project in the mid-1980s. EC policy makers realized that without 
easing the adjustment pressures on poor regions, the Single Market Project would be 
difficult to complete both technically and politically. The legal and political achievements 
in the area of regional policies in the 1970s and 1980s were incorporated into the Treaty 
system with the Single European Act in 1986. After the SEA, the Community created a 
new financial framework to help poor regions to confront adjustment pressures in the 
integrated market. These financial tools included here are a number of financial tools. 
Here are they: the European Regional Development Fund, which was set up in 1975 and 
account for 49 per cent of the 1994-99 cohesion budget; the European Social Fund; the 
Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) 
set up in 1962; and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries set up in 1994 (Van Oudenaren, 
2000: 151). 
In the processes of completing the Single market and establishing the Economic 
and Monetary Union, the EU developed more advanced policy and financial tools to 
support poor regions and promote cohesion across the European market. The volume of 
the Structural funds increased. In the Delors-1 package, the EU created different sources 
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of regional disparities and accordingly different financial tools. For example, in the 1988-
1999 budgets, the EC/U set different objectives. Objective 1 was designed for regions 
where the GDP per Capita was less than 75 per cent of the EU average; Objective 2 
helped regions suffering industrial decline, where unemployment is above the EU 
average; Objective 3 was intended to help regions that suffer from long-term 
unemployment; Objective 4 aided the adaptation of workers in poor regions; Objective 5 
helped agricultural and forestry, and rural development; Objective 6 was intended to 
support sparsely populated Nordic areas. In the 2000-2006 financial perspective, the 
distribution of structural funds for regions was simplified. Objective 1 remained the 
same; Objective 2 was designed for regions that undergo major industrial changes, rural 
areas in serious decline and disadvantaged urban areas; and Objective 3 address all other 
regional problems not covered by the first two Objectives and specifically promote 
economic and social modernization through education, training and employment (Allen, 
2005). 
Today, the EU has deeply entrenched and advanced policy tools to address 
adjustment pressures asymmetrically felt by different regions Regional policies 
complement national policies of state aids or subsidies to lagging regions and in fact seek 
to address the problem of regional disparities and the problem of adjustment pressures 
due to European integration. Like other re-regulatory policies, the prominence of regional 
policies solidified with the Lisbon Strategy that forcefully reconfirmed cohesion as one of 





Adjustment pressures generated by economic integration affect not only functional and 
geographical groups, but also ecological environment. Economic developments 
associating with integration spur industrial growth and intensive use of natural resources, 
and accelerate environmental degradation. Like other re-regulatory policies, 
environmental policies are intended to address the adverse welfare effects of economic 
integration and attendant economic developments. 
Although the Treaty of Rome did not mention environmental issues, environment 
has become one of the most intensely regulated policy areas in the EU. In fact, 
Environmental legislations enacted at the EU level now exceed the quantity and generally 
exceed the quality of environmental legislations enacted at the national levels including 
the leader countries in this area, like the Scandinavian countries (Dinan, 2005: 468). The 
power of the EC in this area gradually expanded. By the early 1970s, the EC had already 
passed regulations on safety rules related to radiation and control of dangerous chemicals. 
But, the real activism of the EC started in the 1970s. The activism of the EC was based 
on a fertile ground provided by a number of developments. The EC member states came 
to share common concerns the environmental effects of EC policies, especially the 
Common Agricultural Policies, which stimulated intensive farming. The politicization of 
environmental issues and the growing consciousness of environmental issues like climate 
change, depletion of the ozone layers, dwindling natural resources and excessive 
pollution have put environment at the top of major policy concerns (Dinan, 2005; Von 
Oudenaren, 2000). 
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In the 1972 Paris Submit, the EC leaders agreed to charge the Commission to 
come up with a multiyear environmental action program that came to be known as EC 
environmental Action Program. Since then, the European Commission has prepared six 
major Actions plans which provide basic guidelines for the EC/U to follow. In 1981, the 
Commission established a new directorate general for environment. The Single European 
Act firmly put environmental policy within the Treaty framework. The SEA set out three 
major objectives for the environmental policy; to preserve, protect and improve the 
quality of the environment; to contribute toward improving human health; and to ensure a 
prudent and rational utilization of national resources (Van Oudenaren, 2000). The status 
of environmental policy was solidified with the Maastricht Treaty, which established 
much more direct connections between environmental policy and economic policy 
making. The establishment of the European Environmental Agency further consolidated 
the institutional foundation of EU environmental policies. The Lisbon Strategy put the 
environmental policies at the heart of European integration by framing it a component of 
sustainable development. 
EU environmental policies regulate environmental standards at all stages from 
production, through distribution, consumption and disposal to make sure that market 
failures do not much affect the welfare of the public (Gatsios and Seabright, 1989; 
Eichener, 1997; Majone, 1996). The EU has a number of detailed regulations on air 
pollution by vehicles, large combustion plants and power stations; noise pollution by 
motor vehicles, aircraft, landowners, household equipment and building-site machinery. 
Since 1975, a series of directives have been enacted to regulate how to handle toxic and 
dangerous waste, the cross-border shipment of hazardous waste, and the disposal of 
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specific types of waste. Since 1976, directives establishing common standards for surface 
and underground water, bathing water, drinking water, fresh water, and the discharge of 
toxic substances (non controlled), and the EU has signed several international 
conventions to reduce pollution in international waterways. 
There are a number of regulations on how to avoid the hazards of chemical 
products, including regulations on the use, storage, handling, packaging and labeling of a 
wide variety of dangerous chemicals, and providing for a European inventory of all 
chemical substance on the market. EU environmental regulations also cover measures for 
nature protections, including regulations on the conservation of wild birds, the protection 
of natural habitats, and on specific experiments on animals, and financially supporting 
projects to conserve natural habitats. The EU also requires environmental impact 
assessments in all public and private industrial or infrastructure projects above a certain 
size, and which require that the public be consulted in the process. 
Like other re-regulatory policies, EU environmental policies complement the 
national ones. In fact, as noted, EU regulations and standards often exceed the national 
ones in both quantity and quality. Given the transnational character of environmental 
problems, EU policies usually enhance the effectiveness of the national practices. 
Based on the preceding examination of the substantive policy objective that 
permeates EU rules and regulations, it is possible to operationalize the second hypotheses 





The Process Hypothesis: 
The governments with more support for European integration tend to comply with EU 
rules and regulations better than the governments with less support. 
The Substance Hypothesis: 
The governments whose partisan preferences are congruent with the objective of market 
regulation are expected to perform better in compliance with EU rules and regulations. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The re-regulatory policies in my data set are health and consumer protection, 
environment, industrial society, employment, consumer policies. Table 5.1 gives a 
breakdown of infringement cases related to compliance with re-regulatory policies in the 
whole data set, according to member states and stages of infringement. I use the same 
statistical tools that I employed in the previous two chapters. Table 5.2 provides 
descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis. 
Table 5.3 presents the models analyzing the determinants of compliance in re-
regulatory policy areas. That the coefficient for the pro-Europeanness variable is 
significant and in the same direction as hypothesized confirms the process hypothesis. 
The more pro-European governments do better in complying with re-regulatory policies 
than the less pro-European governments. Like the process hypothesis, the substance 
hypothesis finds confirmation. The governments with stronger partisan biases toward 
market regulation tend to have a better compliance record in the re-regulatory policies. 
In order to further illustrate the substantive meanings of the coefficients, I 
calculated the predicted probabilities that the governments of the member states as of 
April 30, 2004 would have been referred to the Court of Justice. Table 5.4 shows the 
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ruling governments on April 30, 2004, their partisan compositions, their pro-
Europeanness, Market Regulation scores, and the predicted probabilities of a case 
involving this cabinet being referred to the Court of Justice. 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of Infringement Actions in Re-Regulatory Policies from January 
1995 to May 2004 into Countries and the Stages of Infringement 
 
Country Stages of Infringement  Total 
  LFN RO RC   
Austria 105 101 32 238 
Belgium 88 153 63 304 
Denmark 78 34 5 117 
Finland 105 43 11 159 
France 116 166 122 404 
Germany 105 128 45 278 
Greece 69 118 94 281 
Ireland 91 106 69 266 
Italy 98 179 114 391 
Luxembourg 79 89 73 241 
Netherland 87 57 21 165 
Portugal 113 172 37 322 
Spain 80 108 58 246 
Sweden 112 33 1 146 
UK 113 107 59 279 
Total 1439 1594 804 3837 
 
In the process of compliance with re-regulatory policies, governments like the 
second Schroder Cabinet in Germany, the second Raffarin cabinet in France, the first 
Vanhanen cabinet in Finland, which had scores of 1 in their pro-Europeanness, have 
about 5 % less probability in being referred to the Court than governments like the 
second Schussel cabinet in Austria, the second Ahern cabinet in Ireland and the first 
Rasmussen cabinet in Denmark, which respectively had scores of 0.6, 0.63 and 0.66. 
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Also, the governments like the first Rasmussen cabinet in Denmark, the first Barroso 
cabinet in Portugal and the first Juncker-Polfer cabinet in Luxembourg, which had scores 
of 4.08, 3.17 and 3.30 for market regulations, had around 5 % less probability to be 
referred to the Court than the governments like the second Raffarin cabinet in France and 
the second Schussel cabinet in Austria, which respectively had the scores of 1.68 and 
0.16. 
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables # of Observation Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Infringement 3864 1.77 0.74 1.00 3.00 
Pro-Europeannes 3864 0.90 0.16 0.38 1.00 
Market Regulations 3864 1.51 1.10 0.00 5.44 
Weighted Vote Powers 3864 6.37 2.94 2.00 10.00 
Intra-EU Trade 3864 48.73 30.23 16.80 121.40 
GDP Per Capita 3864 24.68 6.70 12.98 49.23 
Total Government Revenue 3864 40.33 5.57 29.94 54.02 
Membership Age 3864 32.21 17.23 2.00 53.00 
Judicial Review 3864 2.34 0.90 1.00 4.00 
Decentralization 3864 2.47 1.40 1.00 5.00 
Bicameralism  3864 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Corporatism 3864 0.92 1.09 0.00 3.00 
Coalition 3864 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Southern European Countries 3864 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Budget Contribution 3864 7.69 7.80 0.20 30.00 
Time Counter 3864 6.56 2.31 1.00 10.00 
Total Population 3864 29.44 26.83 0.41 82.50 
Life Satisfaction 3864 20.43 13.31 3.00 67.00 
Distrust in National Government 3864 48.64 10.01 20.00 80.00 
Support for a more Speedy Integration 3864 0.85 0.77 -0.60 2.50 
Preliminary Ruling 3864 17.35 17.20 0.00 70.00 
 
On the control variables part of the empirical model, the findings have differences 
as well as similarities with the empirical analyses in the previous two chapters. The 
coefficients for the variables controlling for the possible biases in the infringement data 
are similar to the coefficients for the same variables in the previous models in terms of 
the level of significance and directionality. The differences are in the ways in which the 
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coefficients for the Weighted Voting Power and Intra-EU Trade variables behave. The 
coefficient for the variable Weighted Voting power is positive and significant. Although 
it stands as a puzzle, one interpretation could be that given the relatively recent evolution 
of re-regulatory policies, the large member states that have greater weighted voting 
power may tend to be more indulgent in compliance with these policies. This finding gets 
more interesting, if interpreted with the coefficient for the variable membership age, 
which is positive and significant. It appears that the older states tend to have more severe 
compliance problems that the newer member states. It may be possible that member 
states behave more flexibly in implementing re-regulatory policies. 
The general empirical finding of the analysis is that the governments with a more 
favorable stance toward the EU rule making mechanisms and the substantive outcomes of 
EU re-regulatory policies are less likely to have major problems with compliance with 
these policies. 
SUMMARY 
The analysis of compliance in re-regulatory policies provided a further support for the 
partisan approach. EU re-regulatory policies are substantially different from de-
regulatory policies. The differences are mainly focused on whether they are driven by the 
efficiency and wealth creation concerns or the welfare concern and addressing adverse 
welfare effects of the emerging market. Due to their different implications for different 
interests and values at the domestic level, exploring compliance patterns in these regimes 
provided insightful nuances into the empirical analysis. 
The findings show that the partisan preferences of national governments appear to 
have a systematic impact on whether they comply with EU re-regulatory policies. The 
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governments with a more favorable stance toward market regulations tend to have less 
severe compliance problems than the governments with less favorable stance. This 
chapter completes the empirical analysis parts of the project. The next chapter will 
conclude with tracing substantial implications for major theoretical debates in different 
literatures and setting an agenda for future extension of this project. 
Table 5.3 Ordered Logit Results: Severity of Compliance Problems across Re-Regulatory 
Policies 
 
  Coefficient   Robust Std Error 
Explanatory Variables       
Pro-Europeannes -1.239 *** 0.405 
Free Enterprise  -   - 
Market Regulation -0.212 *** 0.060 
Control Variables     
Weighted Vote Powers 0.290 * 0.152 
Intra-EU Trade -0.004  0.005 
GDP Per Capita 0.077 *** 0.017 
Total Government Revenue -0.011  0.023 
Membership Age 0.017 ** 0.008 
Judicial Review 0.026  0.110 
Decentralization -0.019  0.075 
Bicameralism  -0.707 *** 0.270 
Corporatism -0.050  0.162 
Coalition -0.496 *** 0.157 
Southern European Countries 0.955 *** 0.348 
Budget Contribution 0.152 *** 0.043 
Time Counter -0.143 *** 0.017 
Total Population -0.077 *** 0.020 
Life Satisfaction -0.021 *** 0.007 
Distrust in National Government -0.008  0.008 
Support for a more Speedy Integration 0.001  0.123 
Preliminary Ruling -0.010 *** 0.004 
      
Threshold 1 -1.486  0.920 
Threshold 2 0.479  0.921 
N 3777 
Wald chi2(20) 364.01 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.0507 
Log pseudo-likelihood -3742.4584 




Table 5.4 National Governments as of 30 April 2004, Their Partisan Compositions and 
the Predicted Probabilities of Being Referred to the Court of Justice on the Basis of Their 
Preferences about the Process and Substance of the EU Policy Making 
 
Country Government Partisan Composition Re-Regulatory Policy Areas 
      ProEuroepannes Market Regulation 









Australian People's Party 
(OVP): Freedom Party of 
Austria (FPO); 





Flemish Liberals and 
Democrats (Flemish 
Speaking) (VLD); 
Socialist Party (PS) 
(French Speaking); 
Reform Movement (MR), 
French Speaking; Social 
Progressive Alternativers 
(SPIRIT), Flemish 





Liberal Party (V); 
Conservative People's 





Centre Party (KESK); 
Social Demoratic Party 
(SDP); Swedish People's 





Union for the Presidential 
Majority (UMP); Union 
for the French Democracy 





Social Democrats (SDP); 





New Democracy Party 
0.99 0.11 1.02 0.16 
Ireland The Second Ahern Cabinet 
Fianna Fail (FF); 





FI; AN; LN;CCD-CDU; 
Independents 1.00 0.11 2.10 0.13 
Netherland The Second Balkenende 
Christian Democratic 
Appeal (CDA); People's 
Part for Freedom and 
Democracy (VVD); 





Christian Social Party 
(CSV); Socialist Workers' 





Social Democratic Party 
(PSD); Democratic Social 
Centre/People's Party; 
Independents 0.83 0.13 3.17 0.11 






1.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 





In this project, I have attempted to shed more light into the black hole in our 
understanding of EU compliance. I started out with the premise that significant insights 
could be gained into the process of compliance with EU rules by developing and 
rigorously testing a theory of the domestic politics of international compliance. I have 
explored how the domestic politics is implicated in the process of compliance with EU 
rules. Developing a partisan approach to International compliance, I have demonstrated 
that domestic contestations over compliance with international rules, being structured 
along the process and substance dimensions and mediated through the partisan politics, 
systematically affect the compliance patterns of the governments of the member states. In 
this section of the project, I first summarize the basic findings of the analyses. Then, I 
trace the substantial implications of these findings for major debates in EU studies and in 
political science in general. I end the project with a discussion about the possible future 
extensions of this project. 
SUMMARY OF GENERAL THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The most specific contribution of this project is to provide and test the most systematic 
theoretical approach to date of the domestic politics of international compliance. By 
illuminating micro-processes underlying the choice for compliance, and the structure and 
mechanism of these processes, I provide a more complete approach to the domestic 
politics of international compliance than the existing literature. I first established that 
international compliance is an intrinsic part of the domestic policy process, and stirs 
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contestations among social actors. Then, I showed how social actors form their 
preferences for (non) compliance and contest it, and how these contestations are linked to 
governments’ patterns of compliance. 
Relying on a data set of all infringement actions from 1995 to 2004, I tested the 
process and substance hypotheses of the partisan approach in the context of the European 
Union through a series of empirical analyses. In the empirical analyses, I first examined 
the compliance patterns of member states across all policy areas, and then investigated 
compliance patterns in sub categories of EU policies, de-regulatory and re-regulatory 
policies. Different empirical models yielded the same results that firmly support the 
process and substance hypotheses of the partisan approach. 
The insight that the theoretical and empirical analyses provide is that domestic 
politics and more specifically, the state society relations determine whether countries 
comply with rules made beyond their national boundaries. This insight goes against the 
implicit assumption that mainstream theoretical accounts in both EU compliance and 
international compliance literatures share in common that domestic politics is a black 
box. 
In the EU compliance literature, the dominant theoretical approach, the goodness-
of-fit approach, assumes that compliance is likely to occur to the extent that domestic 
rules and practices fit with EU rules to be complied with. Domestic political variables of 
various types are important only to the extent that they make goodness of fit between 
domestic rules and EU rules politically relevant. Domestic political variables are often 
invoked in an ad hoc basis without a systematic framework. Because of inadequacies in 
its treatment of domestic political variables, this approach came under strong fire. 
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Scholars have called for more systematic treatment of domestic politics in accounting for 
the compliance patterns of member states. This analysis responded to this call, and 
systematically elaborated how and why domestic dynamics matter in EU compliance. 
Likewise, in the international compliance literature, scholars have recently come 
to appreciate the necessity to systematically incorporate domestic political factors into the 
debates on (non) compliance in international regulatory regimes (Haas, 1998; Simmons, 
1994, 2001a; Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002). This appreciation has given rise to two major 
streams of research. The first stream examines general institutional characteristics at the 
domestic level that are supposed to create a propensity to comply with international rules 
without exploring the possibilities for a divergence of preferences among domestic actors 
for (non) compliance and, consequently, for domestic contestations over it. The second 
stream focuses on micro-processes underlying the choice for compliance without 
exploring the basis for domestic actors' preferences for (non) compliance and the precise 
mechanism that mediates this pressure into governments' compliance patterns (Mattli & 
Slaughter, 1998; Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane & Slaugter, 2001; Alter, 1998, 2001). This 
analysis contributes to this literature by developing a theoretical approach to identify the 
bases for domestic actors’ different preferences for international compliance and thus the 
contours of domestic contestations over compliance, and the intermediating mechanism 
that translate these contestations into governments’ compliance patterns. 
BROADER SUBSTANTIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The theoretical and empirical analyses in this project have much broader implications 
going beyond EU compliance and international compliance in general. While some of 
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these implications concern general EU studies, others have insights for international 
relations and comparative politics fields. 
EU Studies 
The results also have ramifications the EU literature. There is a disjunction between two 
booming research areas in the EU literature. The first one is the literature on European 
integration and political conflicts; the second is the literature on EU compliance. While 
the first literature has vigorously charted the contours of domestic policy conflicts 
centered on the EU (Marks & Steenbergen, 2004), the latter have made significant efforts 
to fill the “black hole” in our understanding of EU compliance (Mastenbroek, 2005). It 
has been rare that these two booming fields have intersected. This paper sets a bridge 
between these two literatures by analyzing how and why the domestic political conflicts 
on the EU can affect the EU compliance process. 
The second ramification concerns how EU studies treat the implementation stage 
of EU policy making. The existing literature on the European politics has been heavily 
absorbed into the problems and issues in policy formulation without paying sustained 
attention to what happens once policies are formulated (Hix, 1999; Richardson, 2001; 
Nugent, 2003). One of the premises of this project is that compliance is not simply a 
technical problem of adjusting behaviors according to rules. More often than not, 
compliance is a continuation of politics. Political battles that might have been lost at the 
formulation stage could be re-fought at the compliance stage. In order to understand the 
politics of the European Union, the scholarly attention should be focused on actors and 
interactions involved not just in policy-formulation stage, but also in policy compliance 
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and implementation process. Understanding compliance and showing political dynamics 
behind it could give us a fuller picture of how the EU politics actually works. 
The third implication is that it offers insights relevant to the theoretical debates on 
the nature and limits of European integration. Scholars have been having debates over 
how supranational and intergovernmental forces have interacted in the evolution of 
European integration (Moravcsik, 1991, 1993; Mitrany, 1971; Haas, 1968, 1975; 
Sandholtz, 1993; Garrett and Tsebellis, 1996; Pierson, 1996). While some have 
emphasized the preferences and power of member states as driving integration, others 
have highlighted supranational dynamics and institutions in forcing integration forward. 
Policy compliance is one stage of policy making, which shows the limits of 
supranationalism and the resilience of intergovernmentalism. While supranational 
institutions have a great deal of power in policy-making process, they have to almost 
completely rely on national legal and administrative agents for implementation of these 
policies (Peters, 2000; From & Stava, 1997). 
The last implication of this research for EU scholarship concerns the question of 
whether European integration really has an impact in the member states. The issue might 
be seen as too obvious or trivial, but research has shown that the EU has varying degrees 
of impacts in the member states (Cowles et al., 2001). The concern with the European 
impact on the domestic politics of the member states has given rise to what came to be 
known as Europeanization literature (Andersen & Burns, 1996; Dyson & Featherstone, 
1999; Borzel, 1999; Schmidt, 2002; Radaelli, 2000; Knill & Lenschow, 2001). For EU 
rules to have any impact, they need to be implemented or complied with. So, compliance 
seems to constitute an essential link in the causal chain, in which European rules and 
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practices affect national rules and patterns. This study formulated and empirically tested 
the relevance of the domestic politics for the prospects that EU rules have an impact on 
the domestic politics of the member states. 
International Relations and Comparative Politics 
The results of this analysis have broader ramifications for students of international 
relations and comparative politics. The first literature, for which the results have 
implications, is the literature on international regulatory regimes (Raustiala, 2000; 
Raustiala & Slaughter, 2002). By revealing the importance of partisan politics and 
domestic policy contestations in general for compliance in international regulatory 
regimes, my analysis suggests that whether international institutions have their intended 
effects is systematically determined by how these regimes affect domestic actors, their 
interests and values. Hence, my analysis calls for paying more attention to domestic 
politics in examining the evolution and effectiveness of international institutions (Haas, 
1998; Simmons, 1994, 2001a). 
Moreover, given the importance of compliance for the more general issue of the 
prospects of international cooperation (Gilpin, 2001), the results have even broader 
implications for the IR literature on international cooperation. One of the most visible 
embodiments of international cooperation is the emergence and proliferation of 
international regulatory regimes designed to address policy issues and problems 
commonly shared by states (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1997). In these regulatory 
arrangements, states make legal commitments that put them under specific obligations. 
As the controversies over relative versus absolute gains so well demonstrate, IR scholars 
have long waged a rigorous debate on the consequences of distributive and allocative 
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issues among the states for the prospects of international cooperation (Grieco, Powell, 
Snidal, 1993). The discussion in this paper demonstrates that international cooperation 
depends on distributive and allocative contestations not only among the states, but also 
within the states. 
The analysis also has implications for comparativists. As international regulatory 
regimes proliferate, their rules permeate the domestic politics as well as the international 
politics. Unfortunately, comparativists have remained relatively silent in theoretical and 
empirical studies of compliance with international rules. This analysis is a vivid reminder 
that, given the fact that compliance with international rules has consequences for the 
possibility of attainment of specific policy outcomes at the domestic level, understanding 
compliance with international rules is a substantial challenge for comparativists as well. 
Comparativists need to be more engaged in theoretical and empirical debates on 
compliance with international rules. It appears that, like many other puzzles in the 
discipline, the puzzle of international compliance could be solved only through a close 
collaboration of IR and comparative scholars. 
FUTURE EXTENSIONS FROM THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
What is the next? There are a number of possible future extensions of this project. These 
extensions will be follow-up projects building on the analysis in the current project. The 
first and foremost is a book project which will sharpen the main theoretical ideas 
presented in this project and examine the compliance patterns of member states in a 
broader time horizon at more specific policy areas. The data in this analysis cover 
infringement actions from 1995 to 2004. In the book project, I am going to expand the 
data set to cover all infringement actions before 1995 and after 2004. 
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Another possible extension of this project is to apply this framework to the new 
member states of the EU, which joined in 2004 and 2007. The study of compliance 
patterns of these countries with a relatively more fluid party system would have an 
additional value of how far and in what ways parties and party preferences that are less 
stable than the parties and party systems of old member states of established democracy 
inn the process of making matter in how the new member states deal with EU rules. 
Another extension could be to apply the partisan politics to other instances of 
international compliance. As noted above, there is already suggestive evidence that the 
partisan political dynamics could be relevant in compliance in other regulatory regimes. 
Rathun (2004) demonstrates that partisan politics is implicated in countries’ involvement 
in human rights regimes. Similar findings resonate in other regimes, such as trade 
regimes (Simmons, 1994), exchange rate regimes (Verdier, 1994) and International Labor 
Organization conventions (Boockmann, 2006). The conceptual framework presented in 
this project puts these otherwise scattered findings into a unified theoretical perspective. 
One hypothesis that drives the theoretical argument presented in the project is if 
parties and partisan politics matter in whether countries comply with international rules, 
whether they also relevant in the process of rule making. There is already a large 
literature on how political parties make a difference in the EU decision making. In this 
extension, I will cast the question in broader terms and ask whether parties and partisan 
politics determine membership to international regulatory regimes. If international 
compliance is a matter of domestic contestation for its consequences for the achievement 
of social purposes, it is reasonable to expect that parties and party preferences matter 
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